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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines past and proposed U.S. domestic support in light of current and potential World 
Trade Organization (WTO) constraints. It provides a brief review of U.S. farm policies since the Uruguay 
Round WTO agreements went into effect, including a synopsis of the new Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act of 2008.  It examines the United States’ notifications to the WTO of domestic support from 
1995 to 2005 and provides a preliminary notification estimate for 2006.  
Green-box (non trade-distorting) expenditures for domestic nutrition programs dominate the total 
dollar values notified by the United States. The main notified components of the U.S. support policies for 
agricultural producers include fixed direct payments, disaster assistance, and environmental payments in 
the green box; market price supports for dairy and sugar and substantial price-linked, loan-rate-related 
subsidy expenditures in the product-specific aggregate measure of support (AMS) category; and non 
product-specific support notified as de minimis, including crop market loss assistance payments, 
countercyclical payments, and crop and revenue insurance subsidies.  
The United States’ notification of total AMS has not exceeded the Uruguay Round commitment 
of $19.1 billion. It would have exceeded this amount in some years if the fixed direct payments were 
included in the AMS, an issue arising in challenges to the U.S. notifications. This paper discusses other 
subsidies that may be underreported, misclassified, or omitted, including the blender tax credits and 
mandates related to ethanol production that have been largely outside the disciplines of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture.  
It also provides an assessment of projected U.S. support through 2014. Under the Uruguay Round 
rules, there is essentially no constraint on U.S. policies if high prices projected in mid 2008 are realized. 
The WTO constraints are tighter if the proposed Doha Development Agenda disciplines of July 2008 are 
agreed upon. In that case, under the projected prices, the United States would still have some leeway to 
increase expenditures under its commitments. Thus, if the economic environment that is foreseen in the 
projections proves correct, the United States would be able to adapt to the proposed Doha Round 
domestic support modalities by making only modest adjustments in its policies, although product-specific 
support for sugar, cotton, or other products could face constraints. Large payments under a new revenue 
guarantee program in the 2008 farm bill could violate the U.S. commitments, even if prices remain high 
enough not to trigger traditional countercyclical or loan-rate payments. 
Keywords: U.S. agricultural support, Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, WTO Doha 
Round, notification of domestic support, WTO compliance  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
The issue of U.S. domestic support to agriculture has proved to be contentious in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). A major part of the multiyear WTO negotiations under the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA or Doha Round) has focused on the imposition of tighter disciplines on domestic support. 
The U.S. support expenditures, and those of other high-income countries, have been a significant element 
in the negotiations. The United States has signaled its willingness to accept tighter disciplines on 
domestic support, providing that these are balanced by increased market access in other countries.  
Although the DDA negotiations broke down at a mini-ministerial conference in July 2008, 
domestic subsidies will remain a key issue when negotiations resume. Meanwhile, under the WTO 
dispute settlement process, several challenges have been concluded or are ongoing that raise questions 
about whether the United States is correctly notifying to the WTO or can continue some of its domestic 
agricultural support expenditures within the existing Uruguay Round rules.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine past and projected U.S. domestic support in light of 
current and potential WTO constraints. The first section provides a brief review of recent U.S. farm 
policies, including a synopsis of the new farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. The 
second section discusses U.S. domestic support notifications to the WTO from 1995–2005 and provides a 
preliminary notification estimate for 2006. Section 3 provides a discussion of several subsidies that 
arguably may be underreported, misclassified, or omitted from the notifications. Section 4 provides an 
assessment of projected U.S. support through 2014. These projections are compared with the U.S. 
Uruguay Round commitments, in the absence of a new WTO agreement on agriculture, and to the 
constraints articulated, but not agreed upon, in the proposed July 2008 Doha Round draft modalities. 
Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions.  
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2.  U.S. SUPPORT POLICIES 
Agriculture in the United States today scarcely resembles the troubled sector of the Depression-era 1930s 
that led to farm support programs. The modernization of American agriculture has created a trimodal farm 
sector. At one end of the spectrum are the most efficient commercial farms producing the bulk of food 
and fiber. At the other end are various small farms that account for most of the enumerated units but only 
a small share of output. In the middle are a group of farmers caught in the dynamics of modernization. 
American agriculture is also trimodal in terms of the protection and support it receives from government. 
A few commodities are highly protected by tariffs and import restrictions (dairy, sugar, peanuts, and 
tobacco). Another group of commodities receives most of the subsidy payments (grains, oilseeds, and 
cotton). A third group of commodities (fruits and vegetables, livestock, and poultry) has received less 
protection or government support.   
Reforms of U.S. farm policy have been undertaken as the production and income of farmers have 
undergone change. The basic direction of policy reform has been a shift away from acreage-idling supply 
controls combined with price supports above market-clearing levels to less supply intervention and more 
direct income support, at least for crops that are exported. The shift toward support payments began in the 
mid-1960s, when price support levels were lowered for corn, wheat, and cotton to enhance U.S. 
competitiveness, and farmers were offered payments as compensation (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe 1999). 
Support payments increased from less than 6 percent of farm income in the 1950s to more than 20 percent 
in the 1960s, but farm programs remained dependent on idling land to control supply and boost market 
prices.  
In the early 1970s, a commodity market boom briefly eliminated many government interventions 
in commodity markets, but farm support proved impossible to terminate in the inflationary era that 
followed. A second move toward payments came in the mid-1980s, when price supports that had been set 
too high in anticipation of continued inflation and a low-valued dollar that did not materialize were 
reduced, with payments once again offered to farmers in lieu of higher prices. Further steps in the 
direction of replacing market intervention came with fixed direct payments to farmers under the 1996 
Federal Agriculture Reform and Improvement (FAIR) Act. Subsequently, low world prices resulted in re-
institutionalizing of price-linked countercyclical support payments in 2002. Rising oil prices and energy 
legislation mandates since 2005 have increased biofuel production and have become a dominate factor in 
farm policy. The 2008 farm bill was written in the context of a surge in market prices and projections that 
prices will continue to be higher than they had been earlier in the decade. Traditional subsidies were 
consequently projected to be lower, but a new revenue guarantee program created the possibility of a 
sharp increase if prices fall from the high levels of 2007–08.  
Unilateral Farm Policy Reform Under the 1996 FAIR Act 
The 1996 FAIR Act initiated four changes in U.S. farm support programs for wheat, feedgrains, oilseeds, 
cotton, and rice, compared to previous legislation. First, farmers who received government support were 
given the flexibility to plant whatever crops they chose (except for most fruits and vegetables) on “base 
acreage.”
1 Second, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) authority to require annual idling of 
acreage to limit crop supplies was ended. Third, farmers received fixed income transfers, known as 
production flexibility contract (PFC) payments, that were based on past production and were independent 
of current market prices and farmers’ planting decisions. These fixed income transfers replaced earlier 
“deficiency payments” that had required production of the crop for which payments were received. 
                                                      
1 The term “base acreage” refers to the acreage on which payment eligibility is determined; “deficiency payments” refer to 
subsidies provided on a fixed amount of base-acre output when market prices were below a legislated “target price,” and “loan 
rates” refer to price guarantees for all output of the covered commodities. The 1990 farm bill provided limited flexibility under 
which farmers could shift part of their base acreage among crops, without that land permanently losing payments eligibility, but 
eligibility for deficiency payments was suspended on that acreage during years that alternative crops were grown.   
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Fourth, the price guarantees made to crop producers for any amount of current output through “loan rates” 
were capped under the FAIR Act at nominal levels well below market prices prevailing at the time. By 
1996, mechanisms had also been put in place for most crops that allowed farmers to receive a loan 
forgiveness or cash payment (a “marketing gain” or “loan deficiency payment”)  if market prices were 
below loan-rate levels.
2 Farmers received these cash payments instead of forfeiting their crops into 
government-owned storage. Thus the loan rates continued to support prices for producers, but market 
prices were freed from the loan rate as a floor level and the government was extricated from cumbersome 
commodity stockpiling.  
The changes to farm policy in 1996 were partial reforms in the direction of providing direct 
income transfers instead of using land idling or government stockholding to keep prices above free-
market-clearing levels. Farmers responded to the increased flexibility, or “freedom to farm,” that the 
FAIR Act allowed through substantial movements away from the crops to which deficiency payments 
previously had been tied, particularly by reducing wheat acreage and expanding planting of soybeans.  
Despite its innovations, the extent to which the FAIR Act put farm policy on a less-interventionist 
or less-costly path was uncertain from the outset. The market-oriented innovations in the FAIR Act came 
at a time of high crop prices in 1995 and 1996. It is unlikely that farm policy would have abandoned 
annual acreage idling had market prices not surged upward. As prices rose, agricultural proponents in 
Congress were able to tout the end to annual acreage set-asides and introduction of fixed income-support 
payments as deregulation of a large part of agriculture. Freedom to farm had been a rallying point for the 
Republican Party in the 1950s, the last time before 1995 that Republicans controlled Congress and were 
in a position to set the farm policy agenda. Yet even Republican proponents of these agricultural policy 
changes knew that while the FAIR Act gave farmers more cropping flexibility, it also increased support 
expenditures in the short run because deficiency payments under the old farm program were falling as 
prices increased. Farmers liked the short-run outcomes under the FAIR Act of less regulation of their 
production and the new direct payments. When challenged that these policies undermined the longer-term 
support structure, proponent Pat Roberts (R-Kansas), the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, 
opined that Congress (which had just considered but had rejected elimination of the permanent legislation 
underlying U.S. farm support programs) was the long-term safety net. This turned out to be the case. 
Reinstitutionalizing Higher Farm Support Under the 2002 Farm Security and Rural 
Investment (FSRI) Act 
After spiking upward in 1995 and 1996, crop prices began to fall in 1997 and remained low through 2001. 
As prices fell, support expenditures built into the FAIR Act increased automatically because of the price 
guarantees provided by loan rates. Loan rate expenditures rose to $3.7 billion for the 1998 crop marketing 
year, then exceeded $6.0 billion in 1999, 2000, and 2001.  
Once prices fell sharply, the combination of PFC payments and the built-in increased 
expenditures for price guarantees under the FAIR Act provided less support to farmers than under earlier 
farm programs. Critics decried the 1996 act as “freedom to fail,” with low prices, reduced support, and 
absence of a strong farm safety net. Congress stepped in with “emergency” legislation for supplemental 
annual appropriations for additional payments. The PFC payments were effectively doubled and Congress 
also added new disaster relief and crop insurance subsidies.  
The next farm bill, the FSRI Act of 2002, was written with farm commodity prices still low. It 
incorporated all three tiers of existing support. Fixed direct payments were continued at rates similar to 
those provided by PFC payments under the FAIR Act and were extended to soybeans and other oilseeds. 
Loan rates were continued and most were raised slightly, compared with the maximum levels under the 
FAIR Act. Loan rates were added for several more crops (dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas) and 
reinstated for mohair, wool, and honey. The emergency payments were reinstitutionalized as new 
                                                      
2 Loan repayment rates are determined for each country for wheat, feedgrains, and oilseeds and by a common “effective 
adjusted world price” for rice and upland cotton.  
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countercyclical payments. The countercyclical payments were to be made when the sum of the market 
price (or loan rate if the market price was lower) plus the direct payment was less than newly legislated 
target prices. But farmers retained flexibility to plant a range of crops—they did not have to produce the 
crops for which they received direct and countercyclical payments. Both the direct payments and 
countercyclical payments were made on 85 percent of base acreage for “payment yields” determined 
under the legislation. Each participant was allowed a one-time decision about bases and yields that then 
determined their payment eligibility for the duration of the FSRI Act. The rules for determining base 
acreage were the same for the direct and countercyclical payments, but differed for program yields.
3  
For the import-competing commodities of sugar and dairy, the traditional support programs were 
continued in both the 1996 FAIR and 2002 FSRI acts.
4 Sugar imports remained limited by tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQs) and domestic sugar remained eligible to be forfeited at the loan rate to USDA’s 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) under “non-recourse” loans (for which the commodity collateral is 
accepted in lieu of repayment). Thus, no basic liberalization of the sugar market was achieved and the 
loan rates continued to provide a floor under domestic market prices. For dairy products, TRQs remain 
the primary instrument for keeping domestic prices above world levels. Related dairy provisions of the 
domestic farm bill are among the most complex among farm programs.
5 To provide price support, the 
CCC is authorized to buy butter, cheddar cheese, or nonfat dry milk to sustain fluid milk prices at a 
statutory minimum level. Milk marketing orders also define the relationship between prices of fluid and 
manufactured dairy products and maintain a regulated geographic price structure.  
Passage of the FSRI Act in 2002 was met with derision by domestic policy critics and a barrage 
of international condemnation. In reply, the U.S. House Agriculture Committee offered a strident defense 
of U.S. farm policy, arguing it was “important to national security, ensuring a safe, abundant, and 
affordable domestic food supply.” A document posted on the Committee’s web page, made the claim that 
“Critics of U.S. farm policy would cede our food production to unstable places like the Third World,” and 
asked “but in these times does any American want to depend on the Third World for a safe and abundant 
supply of food and fiber?”  
The disparate and sharply worded views of the 2002 farm bill are indicative of the global conflict 
that has continued to fester over U.S. agricultural trade and support policies. Yet severe critics of the 2002 
bill and its staunch defenders both overstated their cases. The 2002 U.S. farm bill took few constructive 
unilateral steps toward the reduction of subsidies. Nor did it expand the worst subsidy policies as 
                                                      
3 Program yields for direct payments were unchanged in the FSRI Act for those crops previously covered under PFC 
payments. However, those farmers who updated their base acreage were also given options to update yields for the 
countercyclical payments. This distinction between the two support programs in part reflected WTO considerations. The United 
States reported the fixed payments  to the WTO in the green box. By not allowing yield updating, the United States reduced the 
likelihood of a challenge to the classification of these payments, even though updating of the base acreage was allowed. The 
countercyclical payments were also to be made on a fixed acreage and yield and did not require production of specific crops. But 
the countercyclical payments were explicitly linked to market prices and were expected to be reported as trade-distorting policies. 
Thus a claim of being exempt from subsidy limit commitments was not being made and yield updating did not pose as much of a 
threat of a challenge to their classification. Despite these considerations, the Brazilian WTO dispute challenge to the U.S. cotton 
program raised doubts about whether the direct payments qualified for the green box because they were linked to production by 
precluding recipients from growing fruits and vegetables on the base acreage (WTO 2005). This issue is being pursued in 
subsequent cases about the U.S. total AMS brought by Brazil and Canada (WTO 2007a, b), as discussed further below. 
4 For peanuts and tobacco, the traditional production quota programs were abolished through buyouts in 2002 and 2004, 
respectively. See Orden, Blandford, and Josling (2008) for further discussion. 
5 One innovation under the FSRI Act involved a new national program of Milk Income Loss Contracts (MILC) under which 
countercyclical payments were to be made to dairy farmers on a monthly basis when market prices of fluid milk were low. 
Payment eligibility was limited to 2.4 million pounds of milk per year per operation, which corresponded to the production from 
a relatively small dairy herd of about 135 cows. With this limit, about 50 percent of total national milk production was likely to 
be eligible for direct payments, but only about 30 percent of the total production was from the smaller operations that produce 
less than the 2.4 million pound limit. For these small producers, the countercyclical payments created an incentive to expand 
production at the margin because the per-unit price they receive was supported at the target price level. For the larger farms 
producing about 70 percent of the milk in the United States, the payments program was decoupled from production in the sense 
that it provided a variable payment that was inversely related to the price of milk only for a fixed output. This was similar to the 
countercyclical crop support program in the FSRI Act.  
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abhorrently as is sometimes implied. Congress had already intervened to increase the PFC payments to 
farmers on an ad hoc basis when prices were low. The 2002 bill institutionalized those payments, but 
farmers retained the planting flexibility legislated in 1996. As a result, payments were more decoupled 
from production decisions than in earlier legislation under which production of specific crops was 
required. The FSRI Act also included a provision for the Secretary of Agriculture “to the maximum extent 
practicable” to adjust domestic commodity program expenditures to avoid exceeding allowed WTO 
domestic support ceilings, but this authority has never been tested. 
Conservation Programs 
Conservation and environmental programs play an important role in U.S. agricultural production 
decisions. Through these programs, producers receive rental, cost-share, and other payments in return for 
idling land for conservation purposes or using specified farming practices. The FAIR and FSRI acts 
continued and, in most cases, expanded various conservation and environmental programs. The programs 
that retire environmentally sensitive land from crop production were extended and expanded, but most 
new expenditures were targeted to measures for livestock operations and land that remained in 
production.  
Idling of farmland under long-term contracts in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) has 
been the primary conservation and environmental program since 1985. This has a supply-depressing 
effect as well as providing environmental benefits. Written at a time of low prices, the FSRI Act increased 
the authority of the CRP to 39.2 million acres, compared with 36.4 million under the FAIR Act.  
Among the other main environmental programs included in the FSRI Act, the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) provides technical assistance, cost sharing, and incentive payments to 
assist livestock and crop producers with conservation and environmental improvements. Cost sharing (up 
to 75 percent) or incentive payments were authorized for a wide range of practices, including nutrient 
management, livestock waste handling, and conservation tillage, terraces, and filter strips. A new 
Conservation Security Program (CSP) was also initiated, focused on cropland-based practices. Producers 
were to develop and submit a conservation plan to USDA that identifies the resources and designates land 
to be conserved. The plan could include conservation practices that fell within one of three tiers in the 
program. Producers entering into first-tier conservation security contracts received a base payment for 
conducting practices designated in the conservation plan. Producers might also be eligible for bonus 
payments for implementing additional (tier two and three) conservation measures. 
The mix of conservation and environmental support programs under the FSRI Act calls attention 
to the policy discretion involved in U.S. programs regarding acreage idling for these purposes. While the 
U.S. has maintained the CRP and related long-term land-idling since 1985, it is not under any 
international obligation to do so. Historically, the United States has enacted conservation land-idling as a 
supply control measure during times of low prices (the 1930s, the 1960s, and again in 1985) and has let 
these programs expire when market demand is relatively strong.
6  
Expenditures on the CRP fall in the WTO green box, and competitors in world markets naturally 
do not object to land idling in the United States, since this reduces U.S. production and gives foreign 
producers a competitive advantage. The CRP has occasionally been criticized for unnecessarily restricting 
output and keeping world prices for basic grains higher than otherwise, but this was not a policy issue 
with the low market prices in 2002. Were the United States to shift more fully toward support for 
environmental practices on land that continues in production, along the lines of the CSP, output could 
expand but competitors in world markets would have little basis to object under the Uruguay Round 
WTO agreements, providing that support meets the conditions specified under Annex 2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  
                                                      
6 The conservation land-idling program of the 1930s gave way to full-scale production during World War II, but supply 
abundance in the mid-1950s brought another long-term program. This second long-term land-idling program (the Soil Bank) 
enrolled a peak of 28.5 million acres in 1961 but was phased out in the 1970s when U.S. agricultural exports boomed.  
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Continued Support Under the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008  
By 2006, the level of interest in a new farm bill was high. Whereas the Democratic administration in 
1995–96 and the Republican administration in 2001–02 had been relatively passive in formulating farm 
bill proposals, for the anticipated 2007 farm bill, the Secretary of Agriculture called throughout the initial 
discussions for policies that were “equitable, predictable, and beyond challenge.” In January 2007, the 
administration released a detailed proposal to meet its criteria through a set of incremental reforms along 
the path of further decoupling of support from market prices and planting decisions (USDA 2007).  
Several of the administration’s key recommendations related to primarily domestic aspects of 
farm policy. The administration endorsed continuation of direct payments but proposed that nearly $8 
billion over 10 years be shifted from commodity support to conservation programs through other changes 
in policy design. Part of the claimed savings came from converting countercyclical payments from a price 
basis to a nationally calculated revenue basis. This was judged to lower expenditures by taking advantage 
of the natural price–quantity hedge (when output is low, prices are higher and vice versa), which partly 
stabilizes revenue. The administration also proposed a strict means test with a $200,000 income limit for 
support payment eligibility. In aggregate, the administration asserted its proposal held spending for 
agricultural commodity programs close to the level projected under a continuation of the FSRI Act. 
Because world agricultural commodity prices had strengthened noticeably by 2007, the commodity 
support spending in the administration’s proposed farm bill was expected to be much lower than it had 
been during 2002–07. In short, under the administration proposal there was to be a squeeze down of 
traditional commodity subsidies with countercyclical payments and loan-rate-based price supports falling 
sharply.  
Additional administration proposals were related to improving U.S. compliance with the existing 
WTO rules or those under negotiation in the Doha Round. For cotton, lower loan rates were 
recommended, compensated by higher direct payments. This potentially addressed the call for particularly 
strong reforms under the special cotton initiative within the WTO negotiations, with its tight commodity-
specific cap on trade-distorting support. The administration recommended that cultivation of fruits and 
vegetables be permitted on base acres. This would address the issue of whether the direct payments could 
be counted in the WTO green box, raised by the Brazilian challenge to the U.S. cotton program (WTO 
2005). Greater flexibility in U.S. food aid programs was recommended, which would provide the reform 
that the European Union was demanding in the Doha Round and defuse objections that U.S. food aid 
programs were implicitly subsidizing exports.  
By July 2007, however, the House of Representatives had rejected most of the administration’s 
commodity program reform recommendations and drawn objections from the administration over 
proposals for tax increases and use of timing shifts and other gimmicks to mask increased spending in the 
farm bill. The House bill retained the direct, countercyclical, and loan-rate tiers of existing support, 
assuring farmers that the existing programs remained in place in the event that prices fell to lower levels 
than were being projected. The loan rate for sugar was increased and the dairy support program modified 
to provide price supports only for processed products rather than fluid milk, potentially allowing a 
substantial reduction of the dairy support reported in WTO notifications, while having essentially no real 
market effects. The House bill offered new demand-augmenting support for fruits and vegetables but did 
not allow production of these crops on base acres, which was opposed by domestic growers.
7 Overall, the 
House bill partly mitigated the squeeze out of farm-sector spending that higher prices were creating, but it  
did not avoid the substantial reduction anticipated for commodity support due to these higher prices.  
The Senate completed its farm bill in December 2007. The Senate bill also retained the three-tier 
support structure as an assurance to farmers in the event of lower prices. It added an optional crop 
revenue program in place of the existing loan rates and countercyclical payments. This proposal in the 
                                                      
7 Domestic fruit and vegetable growers were concerned about expanded supplies and lower prices and objected to competing 
with farmers receiving base-acres subsidies. The domestic growers’ objections parallel the challenge raised within the WTO to 
the notification of direct payments in the green box as allegedly decoupled. In the WTO challenge, however, the objection is to 
the adverse effects on prices of the subsidized crops from planting restrictions that limit movement into fruits and vegetables.    
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Senate bill differed substantially from the revenue-based program suggested by the administration 
because it linked the new revenue guarantees to a moving average of actual market prices and crop 
acreage and yields, instead of fixed target prices and fixed base-period production levels. The Senate 
revenue insurance program was estimated to provide similar benefits to the existing programs for corn, 
wheat, and soybeans when prices were relatively low but higher benefits if prices remained high (Zulauf 
2007). This was another step toward avoiding a squeeze out of commodity support. Even so, at 
anticipated prices the Senate bill was expected to result in a decline in commodity program spending.  
It took another six months for Congress to finalize the Food, Conservation, and Energy (FCE) 
Act of 2008. In the end, the administration reiterated its earlier criticisms of the congressional bills for 
failing to enact reforms and disguising higher levels of likely expenditures. When the administration 
showed little inclination to negotiate, Congress passed its bill with enough support to be enacted into law 
over a presidential veto.  
In aggregate terms, the FCE Act distributes expected mandatory expenditures for fiscal years 
2008–12 in a similar way to levels anticipated under extension of the FSRI Act. Total expected outlays 
increased by $5 billion and spending shifted significantly among categories at the margin, as shown in 
Table 1. These outcomes reflected efforts to attract a broad coalition of congressional backers through 
increased expenditures for nutrition, conservation, energy, and a host of other programs targeted at 
specific constituencies.  
Table 1. Aggregate anticipated expenditures under the 2008 FCE Act (US$ billion) 
US$ billion, FY2008-FY2012 estimated outlays 






versions of the new 
farm bill) 




Commodity Support   43.3  -1.0; -3.5   41.6 
Conservation   21.4  2.8; 4.4    24.1 
Crop Insurance   25.7  -4.0; -3.7    21.8 
Energy     0.0  2.4; 1.0     0.6 
Nutrition 186.0  4.2;  5.3  188.9 
Other     7.9  1.5; 2.0    12.0 
Total 284.0  5.9;  5.5    289.0 
Sources: Congressional Budget Office 2008; Chite 2007; and Johnson 2008. 
Notes: CBO is the Congressional Budget Office, FSRI is the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, and FCE is the Food 
Conservation, and Energy Act.  
Commodity program spending of $41.6 billion was projected under the FCE Act. In contrast, 
commodity support was $59.3 billion during the previous five fiscal years and was projected to be $78 
billion during those years when the 2002 farm bill was written (Chite 2007). Authority for the CRP was 
reduced to 32 million acres by the FCE Act, but expected expenditures for conservation programs 
increased by $2.7 billion to $24.1 billion, reaching almost 60 percent of the projected commodity support, 
compared with just 25 percent during the previous five years. Thus, in the event of projected high prices, 
a substantial relative shift toward conservation will take place in farm program outlays. But farmers 
remain well protected if prices turn out lower than projected—through retention and even a marginal 
strengthening of the loan-rate and countercyclical tiers of commodity support. The FCE Act included only 
a small pilot program to allow production on base acreage of certain fruits and vegetables (for processing 
on 60,000 acres in seven Midwestern states), with any such acreage planted ineligible for support 
payments during that year. The FCE Act also increased dairy support through milk income loss payments 
and created a new program of payments to processors of domestic or imported cotton to replace the “Step 
2” payments to processors of domestic cotton that had been ruled in violation of WTO rules in the case  
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brought by Brazil (WTO 2005). Various other titles of the farm bill expanded and added programs for 
biofuels, horticultural crops, and disaster assistance.  
One of the proximate causes of the boom in commodity markets prices in 2007-08 was the U.S. 
ethanol fuel tax credit and ethanol use mandates designed to promote corn-based fuel production. These 
are highly product-specific policy instruments reinforced by a high import duty. Initiated in 1978, the tax 
credit, together with other federal and state incentives, had only induced a modest level of ethanol output 
(less than 2 billion gallons in 2005) until oil prices rose and new ethanol use mandates were enacted. The 
federal ethanol tax credit of $0.51 per gallon adds more than $1.50 to the break-even price that can be 
paid for corn converted into ethanol (Tyner 2007). The subsidy exceeded $3 billion by 2007, and the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandated that production reach 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. As oil prices rose 
and wars festered in Iraq and Afghanistan, political calls arose for increased energy security for the 
United States. The Energy Independence and Security Act of December 2007 expanded the mandate for 
biofuels use to 36 billion gallons by 2022, of which 15 billion gallons were to come largely from corn-
based ethanol production. A model-based estimate of the effect on corn market prices by de Gorter and 
Just (2007) suggested an increase of 25 percent ($0.74 per bushel) in 2006 due to the tax credit, assuming 
the mandate was not binding. Other studies have suggested increases of 12–14 percent (by then also 
around $0.70) in 2008–09 (Babcock 2008), or averaged over 2011–17 (FAPRI 2008), due to the 
mandates, tax credits, and U.S. import duties of $0.54 per gallon of ethanol. With record oil prices 
stimulating ethanol production, the new farm bill reduced the ethanol tax credit to $0.45 per gallon but 
extended the ethanol import duty through 2012. 
With high farm commodity prices in 2008, the fixed direct payments to farmers came under 
scrutiny in the domestic policy debate. Decoupled income support payments are encouraged by WTO 
rules as a way of providing an attractive non trade-distorting support option. But with the fixed direct 
payments making up so large a share of the farm support anticipated under the FCE Act, proponents of 
alternative spending eyed reducing those payments as a source of funding for other programs. The direct 
payments were retained only after a rancorous domestic confrontation, particularly in terms of income 
eligibility limits on the recipients. Payment eligibility criteria were tightened modestly (to caps on 
nonfarm income of $500,000 for all three commodity support programs and farm income of $750,000 for 
direct payments only). Payments were also reduced by 2 percent by limiting the base acreage on which 
they were made from 85.0 to 83.3 percent through 2011, then restoring the initial level in 2012 to retain a 
larger budget baseline for future payment projections when the next farm bill is written.   
In one respect the sharp rise in prices in 2008 shifted policy toward a new instrument, as rising 
prices had in 1995–96. In this case, however, the shift was toward a program more closely tied to 
production and market prices. The FCE adopted a modified Senate version of revenue insurance in the 
form of an optional new Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program, which is likely to be 
considered product-specific, trade-distorting support in the WTO. Starting with the 2009 crop, farmers 
electing ACRE for all covered commodities for the duration of the FCE Act incur a 20-percent cut in 
direct payments and a 30-percent cut in their loan rates. In exchange, if crop revenue for the state (yield 
per planted acre times the national average annual price) is below a guaranteed level, and the producer 
incurs a loss of revenue for the crop on their farm, then they are assured of payments of up to 25 percent 
of the revenue guarantee. The guarantee is 90 percent of the revenue derived from multiplying the two-
year national average of lagged prices times the five-year Olympic average of state average yields per 
acre (Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives 2008; Harris et al. 2008). This guarantee 
covers 83.3 percent of the acreage planted or considered to be planted by a farmer in each of the covered 
crops; thus it is based on current production of each crop but total planted acres covered by ACRE are 
capped at the farmer’s total base acres. Once the initial revenue guarantee per acre for each crop is 
established for a farmer entering the program, it cannot vary by more than 10 percent from the previous 
year’s guarantee, moderating any sharp revenue downturn.  
In assessing the cost of the farm bill, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that only 
a relatively small fraction of farmers would enroll in the ACRE program and that its cost would be 
modest. But with prices at historically high levels in the first half of 2008, the administration argued that  
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initiating ACRE with the moving average of prices prevailing in 2007–08 ran the risk of inducing subsidy 
payments at much higher price levels than under the target prices of the countercyclical payments 
program. As an example, the administration assumed that if 90 percent of farmers opted for the ACRE 
program, payments for corn alone would be nearly $4 billion in 2009 at prices as high as $4.00 per 
bushel, compared to no countercyclical payments at prices above the corn target of $2.63 per bushel 
(USDA 2008a). Although the ACRE payments decline once prices stabilize, this example illustrates that 
the ACRE program ratchets up the price level at which subsidy payments would occur during a transition 
period when high prices fall. The ACRE program opened the most substantial opportunity within the FCE 
Act to avoid a squeeze down of subsidy payments due to high prices, as acknowledged by its proponents 
(Brasher 2008). Subsequently, Blandford and Josling (2008) concluded that ACRE program payments 
would in some years exceed commodity-specific caps under negotiation in the Doha Round if prices of 
corn, wheat, and soybeans during 2007–12 followed a pattern similar to the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. We 
also provide an analysis of possible ACRE costs in our assessment of projected U.S. domestic support 
below. 
In addition to the ACRE program, which provides a new optional revenue guarantee, traditional 
crop and revenue insurance programs have expanded with increased government costs in the early 2000s. 
The FCE Act stipulated that total premiums be adjusted slightly to equal total indemnities payments 
(resulting in an expected loss ratio equal to one) and reduced the administrative costs of delivering crop 
and revenue insurance programs by cutting the service rates to insurance agents. Larger claimed five-year 
savings were achieved simply by postponing the timing of some payments past 2012. Nevertheless, with 
higher crop prices the subsidies for crop and revenue insurance were projected to be higher than they had 
averaged under the FSRI Act.  
Congress also had appropriated annual disaster relief to agriculture that averaged nearly $2 billion 
annually during 2000–05. The FCE Act created mandatory funding for five disaster relief programs by 
amending the Trade Act of 1974 to establish a mandatory program (of nearly $4 billion over five years) 
financed from import duties. Again this was a step toward avoiding a squeeze down of support to 
agriculture by ensuring at least partial availability of funds for disaster relief without requiring annual 
congressional appropriations.  
Slight increases in loan rates and target prices contained in the FCE Act strengthen policy 
instruments coupled to production. These will prove innocuous (with the exception of raising the sugar 
loan rate) if prices remain well above loan-rate levels as projected.
8 But these parameter adjustments are 
another signal of the strength of the farm lobby. The argument made, and which will be extended if farm 
price and income conditions deteriorate from their 2008 levels, is that higher energy prices and related 
production costs render inadequate the safety net that was good enough, indeed lauded by many farm 
groups, from 2002 to 2006. Based on this argument, traditional price and income support levels that were 
raised only slightly in 2007 could be increased further in the future.  
Despite all of these considerations, the high world prices that were straining the global food 
system and prompting defensive policy reactions among exporters and importers worldwide in mid 2008 
had only modest effects on the commodity support provisions of the U.S. farm bill. There was no 
significant shift toward decoupled policy instruments, as occurred when prices rose sharply in 1995–96, 
nor were there calls for an end to the permanent support legislation, as was articulated in the earlier 
debate. The veto-proof majorities assembled in Congress for the FCE Act demonstrated the ability of the 
farm lobby to secure a continuation of support programs that largely serve the same purposes and benefit 
the same interest groups as earlier legislation. Still, the farm lobby did not avoid, at least for the time 
being, a projected squeeze down of anticipated subsidy payments under the price-linked support 
programs. 
                                                      
8 The loan rate for raw cane sugar rises from $0.18 per pound to $0.1875 by 2012. The Secretary of Agriculture is required 
to set domestic marketing allotments at no less that 85 percent of estimated quantities for domestic human consumption and to 
purchase sugar to produce biofuels if necessary to avoid forfeitures of sugar to the Commodity Credit Corporation, thus 
insulating domestic producers from the pressure of increased imports under trade agreements.   
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3.  WTO NOTIFICATIONS OF U.S. DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
The United States has provided the WTO with notifications of its domestic support for the 11 years 
between 1995 and 2005. The notification for green-box support (Supporting Table DS:1 in the 
notifications) is on a federal fiscal year basis (October–September).
9 The product-specific tables on the 
aggregate measure of support (AMS) (Supporting Tables DS:3–7) are on a marketing-year basis. The non 
product-specific AMS data (Supporting Table DS:9) relate to both marketing years and fiscal years.
10 As 
a result, the aggregations used in calculating the notified AMS and de minimis include data for a mixture 
of years. Commodity and program details given in the tables in this paper are based on conformable data. 
If a notification was provided for any commodity or program during the period 1995–2005 that category 
is included in the table, but if no notification was provided in a given year, there is a blank entry in the 
table.
11 
Figure 1 graphs support notified to the WTO under the green, blue, total AMS and de minimis 
categories, and Figure 2 shows the percentage composition of support in each year. Table 2 provides the 
numerical detail for these support categories.  
Figure 1. U.S. notified domestic support (US$ billion), 1995–2005 
Source: Computed from WTO notifications. 
                                                      
9 The structure of the WTO notification tables is presented in a WTO document (1995). See Brink (2007) and Orden (2008) 
for further discussion. The official U.S. notifications are available on-line in the G/AG/N series of documents (e.g 
G/AG/N/USA/60 for the notification for 2002–2005).  
10 The periodicity of the estimated data in Table DS:9 is unclear in some cases. It is possible that some of the source data 
relate to calendar years. The de minimis threshold below which product-specific and non product-specific support can be exclude 
from the total AMS is 5 percent of the value of production. 
11 The U.S. notification for 2004 contains an error for the market price support (MPS) calculation for sugar. This was 
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Source: Computed from WTO notifications. 
Table 2. Summary of U.S. domestic support notifications, 1995-2005 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   (US$ billion) 
Total  AMS  6.21 5.90 6.24  10.39  16.86  16.80  14.41 9.64 6.95  11.63  12.94 
De minimis
a  1.48 1.15 0.80 4.74 7.43 7.34 7.04 6.69 3.24 6.46 5.98 
Blue  7.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Green  46.04 51.83 51.25 49.82 49.75 50.06 50.67 58.32 64.06 67.43 71.83 
Total  support  60.77 58.88 58.29 64.95 74.05 74.20 72.13 74.65 74.25 85.51 90.75 
   Share of total support (%) 
Total  AMS  10% 10% 11% 16% 23% 23% 20% 13%  9% 14% 14% 
De minimis
a  2% 2% 1% 7%  10%  10%  10% 9% 4% 8% 7% 
Blue  12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Green  76% 88% 88% 77% 67% 67% 70% 78% 86% 79% 79% 
Total  support  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:  WTO notifications and authors’ calculations. 
a Includes product-specific and non product-specific de minimis.  
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Green-Box Support 
Total notified support rose from roughly $60 billion in the mid-1990s to more than $90 billion in 2005. 
The largest category of support is in the green box. This has grown from $46 billion in 1995 to $72 billion 
in 2005 and now accounts for roughly 80 percent of total notified U.S. support. Table 3 shows that the 
most rapidly growing category of green-box expenditure is for domestic food aid, which accounted for 70 
percent of the green-box total in 2005. In terms of payments to farmers, decoupled income support has 
been the most important component of the green box. Decoupled income support is composed mostly of 
the fixed direct payments initiated in the 1996 FAIR Act whose status is being questioned in the WTO, 
but it also includes peanut and tobacco buyout payments starting in 2002 and 2004, respectively. Disaster 
relief and environmental payments have also been important green-box agricultural support expenditures. 
Together these three categories have totaled roughly $10 billion annually in recent notifications. Blue-box 
support is not important for the United States because the deficiency payments for major crops that would 
have been included in this category were eliminated by the FAIR Act. 
Table 3. U.S. green-box notifications 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   US$ billion  
General  services  6.42 6.55 6.80 7.23 7.69 8.55 9.21  10.26  10.94  11.20  11.35 
Public stockholding/food   
security  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Domestic food aid  37.47  37.83  35.96  33.49  33.05 32.38 33.92 38.01 42.38 45.86 50.67 
Decoupled income 
support
a  0 5.19 6.29 5.66 5.47 5.07 4.10 5.30 6.49 5.27 6.16 
Income insurance/safety 
nets  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Disaster  relief  0.10 0.16 0.16 1.41 1.64 2.14 1.42 2.12 1.69 1.96 0.17 
Producer  retirement  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Resource  retirement  1.73 1.73 1.69 1.69 1.43 1.48 1.62  0  0  0  0 
Investment  aids  0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 
Environmental  payments  0.23 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.29 2.51 2.45 3.04 3.40 
Regional  assistance  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  46.04 51.83 51.25 49.82 49.75 50.06 50.67 58.32 64.06 67.43 71.83 
Source: WTO notifications. 
a Subtracting peanut and tobacco buyout payments, fixed direct payments are 5.27 in 2003, 5.26 in 2004 and 5.22 in 2005. 
Product-Specific Support 
Figure 1 shows that amber-box support—defined as the total AMS plus product-specific (PS) and non 
product-specific (NPS) support that is notified as de minimis—can vary substantially from year to year 
depending on prices and production. In periods when prices are low, such as 1999–2000, support can 
increase markedly in comparison to periods such as 1996–97 when prices of farm products were 
relatively high. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the product-specific AMS (before the application of de 
minimis) by type of measure. The market price support (MPS) component of the AMS is based on 
administered (loan rate) support prices that exceed fixed reference price levels set in the U.S. Uruguay 
Round schedule. MPS amounts to nearly $6 billion in most years. The MPS for peanuts was eliminated as 
a result of changes in the peanut program under the 2002 FSRI Act.  
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Table 4. Composition of the product-specific AMS by type of measure (before the application of de 
minimis) 
    1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003 2004 2005 
Type of measure  (US$ million)  
Market price 
support  6,213  5,919  5,816 5,776 5,921 5,840 5,826 5,771  5,758 5,832 5,908 
    Dairy  4,693  4,674  4,455 4,332 4,437 4,377 4,483 4,509  4,515 4,646 4,794 
    Sugar    1,108  937  1,045 1,093 1,180 1,133 1,032 1,262  1,242 1,186 1,114 
  Peanuts 
  412  308  315 350 303 330 311  0  0  0  0 
Emergency 
payments    0 0 0  331  697  1,526  6  1,409 1 41 85 
Price-linked 
subsidies  88  6  578 4,106 9,706 9,042 8,429 3,525  1,141 5,549 6,616 
Other support
a  10 12 80 338 567 457 367 523  487 853 447 
Total  6,311 5,938 6,475 10,550 16,891 16,865 14,628 11,227 7,386 12,275 13,055 
                       
Type of measure  (% of total)  
Market price 
support  50%  50%  47% 35% 26% 26% 28% 34%  44% 32% 31% 
Emergency 
payments    0%  0%  0% 2% 3% 7% 0% 8%  0% 0% 0% 
Price-linked 
subsidies  1% 0% 5% 25% 43% 40% 41% 21% 9% 31% 35% 
Other  support  0%  0%  1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3%  4% 5% 2% 
                       
Major price-
linked subsidies  (US$ million)  
Certificate 
exchange  gains  0 0 0  6  175  619  1,975  317  307  1,453  167 
Commodity loan 
forfeit  0 0  -2  6  642 20 20  658 1 11  1,010 
Loan deficiency 
payments  0  0  3 2,723 6,062 6,192 5,588  546  475 3,695 4,801 
Marketing loan 
gains/payments  0  0  161  1,092  1,830 813 615 185  132 341 265 
Cotton user 
marketing 
payments  35  6  416 280 446 237 182  0  0  0  0 
Milk income loss 
contracts  0  0  0 0 0 0 0  1,795  221 9  352 
Oilseed  payments 0  0  0 0  460  921 0 0  0 0 0 
Other
b    53 0 0  0 92  241 49 23 9 40 21 
Source: Computed from WTO notifications. 
a Includes commodity loan interest subsidies and storage payments, cotton user marketing (Step 2) payments, bioenergy program 
payments, and assorted others.   
b Includes adjustment assistance payments, support payments for mohair and wool, and miscellaneous payments for cotton, dry 
peas, sugar, and wheat.  
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Tables 5 to 7 provide detailed information on the commodity composition of the notified product-
specific AMS. The first thing to note is that a comprehensive table reveals that in some cases notifications 
have been provided in various years under different headings for related commodities. For example, 
notifications have been provided for individual orchard and vineyard crops as well as an aggregate of 
those crops; the same applies to livestock. The impact of this on the AMS is unclear. But it is possible 
that part of the support notified for livestock in 2002 (more than $1.1 billion in Table 5), which was 
excluded from the notified total AMS (see Table 6) because of de minimis, would have been counted if it 
had been apportioned to individual livestock categories. This is not to imply that the notification was 
deliberately intended to achieve that effect, but when appropriate data is not available the mixing of 
overlapping product categories in the notifications raises an issue for identifying accurately the amount of 
support provided for individual commodities. 
A comparison of the AMS in Tables 5 and 6 before and after de minimis reveals that product-
specific de minimis has generally not been a major factor in reducing notified support, with the exception 
of the 2002 exclusion of payments to livestock farmers. However, the exclusion has reduced significantly 
the number of years for which AMS support has been notified for a wide range of commodities. For 
example, an AMS applied to barley in all 11 years, but after the application of de minimis less than half 
the years have a barley AMS included in the U.S. total AMS. 
Table 7 shows the percentage composition of the product-specific total AMS by commodity after 
the application of de minimis. Dairy and sugar MPS has consistently accounted for significant shares of 
the total AMS. However, when crop prices have been low, for example during 1998–2001, the included 
subsidy payments have increased for the major field crops, such as corn and soybeans, and their share of 
the total AMS has been important. Cotton which has been particularly contentious in the WTO 
negotiations accounts for as much as 19 percent of the U.S. total AMS in several years. 
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Table 5. Product-specific AMS by commodity (before the application of de minimis) 
    1995 1996 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Commodity (US$  million
a)
Apples       99  175    4      
A p r i c o t s           2         
Avocados                  0 
Barley  1 1 4 84 40 70 16  4  1 83  46 
Beef  and  Veal                   
Blueberries,  wild              0      
Cattle and calves                136       
Chickpeas              0  0  0  0 
Corn  32  28  150 1,534 2,554 2,757 1,270  187  233 3,059  4,490 
Cotton  32  3  466  935  2,353 1,050 2,810 1,187 435 2,238  1,621 
Cranberries       20            
Dairy  4,655 4,691 4,456  4,560  4,660  5,070  4,483  6,305  4,737  4,663  5,149 
Dry  peas              0  14  32 37 
Grapes              0    1 
Hogs  and  pigs      123               
Honey  1    0 0  29   0  0  2  0 
Lentils              2  0  1  11 
Livestock              1,110  1  2  0 
Lychee              0  0   
Minor  Oil  Seeds:                   
    Canola  0  0  0  8  39  82  23  0  7  4  14 
    Crambe          1  2  0  0  0  0   
    Flaxseed    0  0  2  11  25  12      0   
    Mustard Seed      0  0  1  0  0         
    Rapeseed          0  0  0         
    Safflower  0  0  0  0  2  3    2       
    Sesame            0           
    Sunflower  0  0  0  21  143  161  55  0  0    18 
Mohair  15    0 2 2 0 5  4  3  2 
Oats  0 0 0 20 31 45  4  0  3  3  0 
Olives              1     
Onions         10          
Orchards & 
vineyards                5 0 
Peaches          7        
Peanuts  415 299 306  340  349  438  305  66  21  32  89 
Pears          3        
Pecan  trees                1   
Potatoes       14  26    1    
Rice  12 6  6  21 435  624  763  712  503  131  133 
R y e   0                  
Sheep and lamb          13  10  22  23    14   
Sorghum  0 1 2 63  154  84  6  4 17  130 140 
Soybeans  16 14 45  1,275  2,856  3,606  3,610 52  25 506  69 
Sugar
  1,091 908 1,011  1,055 1,207 1,177 1,061 1,328  1,250  1,248  1,199 
Tobacco -2  -21  -8  -7  924  519  -1  70  19  20   
T o m a t o e s           7         
Wheat  5  8  36 516 974 847 189  22 107 91  29 
Wool  38      9  33   8  7  7  7 
All  commodities  6,311 5,937 6,475 10,550 16,891 16,865 14,628 11,227 7,386 12,275  13,055 
Source: Based on data from WTO notifications 
a No value means no notified support, 0 means less than $0.5 million.   
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Table 6. Product-specific total AMS by commodity (after the application of de minimis) 
    1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 
Commodity (US$  million
a)
 
Apples        99  175           
A p r i c o t s           2            
A v o c a d o s                      
Barley       84  40  70       83  46 
Beef  and  Veal                    
Blueberries,  wild                     
Cattle  and  calves                     
Chickpeas                0 0 0 
Corn        1,534 2,554 2,757 1,270      3,059 4,490 
Cotton      466  935 2,353 1,050 2,810  1,187  435 2,238 1,621 
Cranberries        20             
Dairy  4,655  4,691  4,456 4,560 4,660 5,070 4,483  6,305  4,737 4,663 5,149 
Dry  peas                14  32  37 
G r a p e s                      
Hogs  and  pigs                    
Honey          29           
Lentils              2     11 
Livestock                     
Lychee                     
Minor  Oil  Seeds:                     
    Canola        8  39  82  23        14 
    Crambe          1  2  0  0    0    
    Flaxseed        2  11  25  12          
    Mustard Seed  0  0  0  0  1  0            
    Rapeseed  0  0  0    0  0  0          
    Safflower  0  0  0  0    3    2        
    Sesame            0            
    Sunflower          143  161  55          
Mohair  15       2 2    5  4 3 2 
Oats       20  31  45           
Olives                     
Onions                     
Orchards & 
vineyards                     
Peaches                     
Peanuts  415  299  306 340 349 438 305 66      89 
Pears                     
Pecan  trees                     
Potatoes                     
Rice          435 624 763  712  503 131 133 
R y e                      
Sheep and lamb              22  23        
Sorghum       63  154  84       130  140 
Soybeans        1,275 2,856 3,606 3,610           
Sugar
  1,091  908  1,011 1,055 1,207 1,177 1,061  1,328  1,250 1,248 1,199 
Tobacco        924  519           
T o m a t o e s                      
Wheat       516  974  847           
Wool  38       9  33    8  7 7 7 
All  commodities  6,214  5,898 6,238 10,392 16,862 16,803 14,413 9,637 6,950 11,595 12,938 
Source: Based on data from WTO notifications. 
a No value means no notified support, 0 means less than $0.5 million.   
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Table 7. Product-specific total AMS by commodity (after the application of de minimis %) 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Commodity
a               
Apples              0.6%  1.0%                
Apricots                 0.0%                
Avocados                                  
Barley           0.8%  0.2%  0.4%           0.7%  0.4% 
Beef and Veal                                  
Blueberries, wild                                  
Cattle and calves                                  
Chickpeas                          0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Corn           14.8%  15.1%  16.4%  8.8%        26.4%  34.7% 
Cotton          7.5%  9.0% 14.0%  6.2% 19.5% 12.3%  6.3% 19.3% 12.5% 
Cranberries              0.1%                   
Dairy  74.9% 79.5% 71.4% 43.9% 27.6% 30.2% 31.1% 65.4% 68.2% 40.2% 39.8% 
Dry peas                          0.2%  0.3%  0.3% 
Grapes                                  
Hogs and pigs                                  
Honey                 0.2%                
Lentils                       0.0%        0.1% 
Livestock                                  
Lychee                                  
M i n o r   O i l   S e e d s :                
    Canola           0.1%  0.2%  0.5%  0.2%           0.1% 
    Crambe              0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     0.0%    
    Flaxseed           0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%             
    Mustard Seed  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%                
    Rapeseed  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     0.0%  0.0%  0.0%             
    Safflower  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     0.0%     0.0%          
    Sesame                 0.0%                
    Sunflower              0.8%  1.0%  0.4%             
Mohair  0.2%           0.0%  0.0%     0.1%  0.1%  0.0%  0.0% 
Oats           0.2%  0.2%  0.3%                
Olives                                  
Onions                                  
Orchards & 
vineyards                                  
Peaches                                  
Peanuts  6.7% 5.1% 4.9% 3.3% 2.1% 2.6% 2.1% 0.7%          0.7% 
Pears                                  
Pecan trees                                  
Potatoes                                  
Rice                  2.6% 3.7% 5.3% 7.4% 7.2% 1.1% 1.0% 
Rye                                  
Sheep and lamb                    0.2%  0.2%          
Sorghum           0.6%  0.9%  0.5%           1.1%  1.1% 
Soybeans           12.3%  16.9%  21.5%  25.0%             
Sugar  17.6% 15.4% 16.2% 10.2%  7.2%  7.0%  7.4% 13.8% 18.0% 10.8%  9.3% 
Tobacco              5.5%  3.1%                
Tomatoes                                  
Wheat           5.0%  5.8%  5.0%                
Wool  0.6%           0.1%  0.2%     0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
All  commodities  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Based on data from WTO notifications.  
a No value means no notified support, 0 means less than $0.5 million.   
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Non Product-Specific Support 
Several important forms of support are included under the non product-specific (NPS) AMS category 
(Table 8). The crop market loss assistance (MLA) payments from 1998 to 2001 and countercyclical 
payments initiated in 2002 exceeded $4.0 billion in five years, including 2005. Crop and revenue 
insurance subsidies have been another important component of NPS support, with lesser payments under 
various emergency assistance programs.  
The variability in the NPS support is also apparent in Table 8, and again this is related to price 
movements. The NPS support increased sharply in the late 1990s as Congress responded to declining 
prices by increasing the assistance provided to U.S. farmers. Among the measures taken was to 
supplement the fixed direct payments that farmers received under the 1996 FAIR Act through crop MLA 
payments. Since these were paid to farmers in proportion to their total eligibility for direct payments, they 
were notified as non product-specific support.
12 The 2002 FSRI Act introduced the countercyclical 
payments, which are directly linked to market prices but are based on fixed areas and yields. The 
introduction of these price-responsive forms of support has contributed to an increase in NPS support and 
has also made it more variable. Since 1998, when MLA payments were first introduced, such support has 
varied between $0.5 and $5.5 billion.  
Table 8. U.S. non product-specific AMS 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 
   (US$ billion)  
Irrigation  projects  0.380 0.380 0.349 0.349 0.316 0.316 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.269  0.269 
Livestock  grazing  0.045 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.055 0.051 0.065 0.047 0.041 0.047  0.039 
Crop and revenue 
insurance  0.913 0.636 0.119 0.747 1.514 1.396 1.770 2.889 1.862 1.123  0.756 
Rio Grande water loss 
assistance                       0.010          
Tree assistance program 
(CA/NY)                          0.002       
Multiyear crop disaster 
payments           0.577                      
State  credit  programs  0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049                
Emergency loans for 
seed producers              0.003        0.049  0.049  0.049  0.049 
Farm storage facility 
loans              0.001  0.003  0.004  0.001  0.003  0.002  0.000 
Crop market loss 
assistance payments           2.811  5.468  5.463  4.640           
Countercyclical 
payments                       1.804  0.544  4.288  4.749 
Total  1.386 1.115 0.567 4.584 7.406 7.278 6.828 5.101 2.801 5.778  5.862 
Source: WTO notifications.  
The United States has excluded NPS support from its notified total AMS as being under de 
minimis in all years. This de minimis exclusion has proved to be extremely important to the U.S. 
notifications. Table 9 summarizes the composition of the reported de minimis and shows the dominance 
of the NPS de minimis in total de minimis. Because of the large value of total U.S. agricultural production 
(averaging roughly $210 billion between 1995 and 2005), the NPS support would have had to have been 
roughly $3 billion greater than the maximum notified amount in order to breach the 5 percent de minimis 
                                                      
12 Market loss assistance payments were provided for some commodities (e.g., dairy) that are not included in the 
determination of NPS payments to farmers. As noted above, these were notified as product-specific AMS.  
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ceiling. As shown in Table 2, de minimis as a whole has accounted for up to 10 percent of total notified 
support. 
Table 10 presents several alternative summations of the notified U.S. support. The size of the de 
minimis exemption was equivalent to more than 40 percent of the notified total AMS (after de minimis) 
on average, and it almost reached 70 percent in 2002.  Most significant, if the United States had not been 
able to use this exemption, it would have exceeded its total AMS binding in 1999–2001. 
Table 9. Composition of U.S. de minimis 
Source: Calculated from data in WTO notifications. 
Table 10. Summary and alternative summations of notified U.S domestic support, 1995-2005 
    1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003 2004 2005 
   (US$ billion) 
Total  AMS  6.21  5.90  6.24 10.39 16.86 16.80 14.41  9.64  6.95 11.63 12.94 
De minimis 
a  1.48  1.15  0.80 4.74 7.43 7.34 7.04 6.69  3.24 6.46 5.98 
Blue  7.03  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Green  46.04 51.83 51.25 49.82  49.75  50.06 50.67 58.32  64.06 67.43 71.83 
Total  support  60.77 58.88 58.29 64.95  74.05 74.20 72.13 74.65 74.25  85.51  90.75 
                      
   Alternative summations (US$ billion and %) 
URA  AMS  Binding  23.08 22.29 21.49 20.70  19.90 19.10 19.10 19.10 19.10  19.10  19.10 
Total amber 
b  7.70  7.05  7.04 15.13 24.30 24.14 21.46 16.33  10.19 18.09 18.92 
As percent of binding  33%  32%  33%  73%  122% 126% 112%  85% 53%  95%  99% 
De minimis/total  AMS  24%  20%  13% 46% 44% 44% 49% 69%  47% 56% 46% 
De minimis/total  amber  19%  16%  11% 31% 31% 30% 33% 41%  32% 36% 32% 
Total AMS+NPS (with DPs)
c  6.21  5.90  6.24 20.63 29.74 29.15 25.34 20.04  6.95 11.63 12.94 
As percent of binding  27%  26%  29%  100%  149% 153% 133% 105%  36% 61% 68% 
Total AMS + CCPs + DPs
d  6.21 11.08 12.52 18.86  27.80  27.33 23.15 16.74  12.76 21.18 22.91 
As percent of binding  27%  50%  58%  91%  140% 143% 121%  88% 67%  111% 120% 
Source: WTO notifications. 
Notes: URA is the Uruguay Round Agreement. 
a Includes product-specific and non product-specific de minimis. 
b Total amber is defined as total AMS + de minimis. 
c Fixed direct payments (DPs) only count against the total aggregate measure of support (AMS) limit (and are added to the total 
AMS), if their inclusion in the non product-specific (NPS) support causes this to exceed the de minimis threshold. Fixed direct 
payments exclude buyout payments for peanuts and tobacco that are included in notified green-box decoupled income support. 
d Assumes that crop market loss assistance (MLA) payments, countercyclical (CCP) payments and fixed direct payments 
(excluding buyout payments) are re-classified as product-specific support. 
An important issue for the United States is the notification status of some of its programs in light 
of the Brazilian cotton case (WTO 2005) and further challenges to its support payments by Brazil and 
    1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
   (US$ million) 
Product  specific  97  40  236 158  29  63 215  1,590 436 680 118 
Non  product-specific  1,386 1,115  567 4,584 7,406 7,278 6,828 5,101 2,801 5,778 5,862 
Total  1,483 1,155  804 4,742 7,435 7,341 7,043 6,690 3,237 6,458 5,980 
                  
   (% of total) 
Product  specific  7% 3%  29% 3% 0% 1% 3%  24%  13%  11% 2% 
Non  product-specific  93% 97%  71% 97%  100% 99% 97% 76% 87% 89% 98%  
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Canada (WTO 2007a, 2007b). The cotton case ruling cast doubt on whether the fixed direct payments, 
which are currently notified as green-box decoupled income support, qualify for that category. If direct 
payments had been notified in the amber box, the United States would have violated its total AMS 
commitment in a number of years. Table 10 shows that if direct payments were notified as non product-
specific support (following the approach used by the United States for countercyclical payments) the total 
AMS binding would have been exceeded in 4 of the 11 years for which notifications have been provided 
to the WTO. If both crop market loss assistance and countercyclical payments as well as the fixed direct 
payments were counted as product-specific support (as may be argued by Canada or Brazil, based on the 
precedent of the cotton case ruling) the United States would have exceeded its commitment in 5 of the 11 
years.   
Shadow Notification for 2006 
Sufficient data are available to generate estimates for the U.S. total AMS for 2006.
13 These are contained 
in the final column of Table 11, which also summarizes comparable information from the official 
notifications. 
The “shadow” notification for 2006 reinforces the point about the importance of commodity 
prices for U.S. WTO notifications. When prices are high, price-linked subsidies decline and this reduces 
notified support. The estimated total AMS for 2006 is $7.8 billion, compared to $13 billion in 2005. The 
MPS component increased by roughly $280 million due to higher production of milk and sugar, but 
higher prices caused a significant fall in product-specific AMS payments for crops. These price-linked 
payments fell from $6.7 billion for marketing year 2005 to $1.4 billion for 2006. The virtual elimination 
of loan deficiency payments for corn in 2006 accounted for most of the reduction in the product-specific 
AMS and support for this commodity fell below de minimis. Higher prices also caused the product-
specific de minimis thresholds to increase slightly for several other important grains (barley, rice, and 
sorghum) and the reduced support for these crops also fell below the de minimis level in 2006. 
Table 11. Support notified under the AMS with shadow notification for 2006 
   Official notifications  Shadow 
Type of support  (US$ million)  
    1995 1996 1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 2003  2004  2005  2006 
Product-specific 
(PS)  support                       
  Market price  
support 6,213  5,919  5,816  5,776  5,921  5,840  5,826 5,771  5,758 5,832 5,908  6,191 
Nonexempt 
payments 88  7  578  4,437  10,403  10,567  8,435 4,934  1,142 5,590 6,700  1,396 
  Other support   10  12  80  338  567  457  367  523  487  853  447  346 
Total  6,311 5,938 6,475  10,550 16,891 16,865  14,628 11,227 7,386 12,275 13,055  7,933 
Product-specific de 
minimis  exclusion  97  40 236  158  29  63  215  1,590 436  680  118  153 
Nonproduct-
specific (NPS) 
support 1,386  1,115  567  4,584  7,406  7,278  6,828 5,101  2,801 5,778 5,862  5,121 
Percent of value of 
production 0.7%  0.5%  0.3%  2.4%  4.0%  3.8%  3.4% 2.6%  1.3% 2.5% 2.5%  2.1% 
NPS de minimis 
exclusion 1,386  1,115  567  4,584  7,406  7,278  6,828 5,101  2,801 5,778 5,862  5,121 
Notified total AMS  6,214  5,898  6,238  10,392  16,862 16,803  14,413  9,637 6,950 11,595 12,938  7,780 
Source: WTO notifications and authors' estimates. 
                                                      
13 The principal source of information is the Commodity Estimates Yearbook of the Commodity Credit Corporation (USDA 
2008b).   
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The U.S. NPS support is estimated to have fallen slightly from $5.9 billion in 2005 to $5.1 billion 
in 2006. Higher commodity prices resulted in a reduction in countercyclical payments from $4.7 billion to 
$3.2 billion, but crop and revenue insurance subsidies increased sharply from $750 million to $1.6 billion. 
The NPS support in 2006 was equivalent to roughly the same percentage of production as in recent years 
(2.1 percent) and remained comfortably below the de minimis threshold. The NPS support was equivalent 
to 65 percent of notified total AMS (after de minimis), thus accounting for nearly 40 percent of the non 
green-box support provided to U.S. farmers in 2006. The potential role of NPS support under tighter 
restrictions on domestic support being discussed in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations is examined 
later in the paper. 
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4.  POTENTIALLY UNDERREPORTED, MISCLASSIFIED, OR OMITTED SUBSIDIES 
Beyond the traditional price and income support programs (direct payments, countercyclical payments, 
and loan-rate program benefits), a number of questions arise about how subsidies are being captured in 
the U.S. notifications. Some of these issues are being addressed in the challenges to U.S. support 
programs raised by Brazil and Canada in their total Aggregate Measure of Support (TAMS) cases (WTO 
2007a, 2007b). Others are not being raised in that context. Here we discuss briefly five categories of 
subsidies that may be underreported, misclassified, or omitted from the U.S. notifications.  
Disaster Payments 
The U.S. notifications report disaster payments of various types under the green box (Table DS:1), 
product-specific support (Table DS:6), and non product-specific support (Table DS:9), as shown in 
Tables 3, 4, and 8 in this paper. The Canadian request for establishment of a panel in the TAMS case lists 
48 separate disaster programs over the period 1999–2005 (WTO 2007b). During that period, disaster 
relief payments notified in the green box ranged from a low of $100 million in 1995 to a high of $2.14 
billion in 2000 (Table 3). Questions of whether all disaster programs have been included in the U.S. 
notifications, whether those notified in the green box satisfied the relevant criteria, and whether the 
annual expenditures on these programs have been correctly measured may emerge as issues in the WTO 
case. Potentially some disaster payments could be judged to provide product-specific support not exempt 
under the green box. Inconsistency of a disaster program with the specific green-box criteria for the 
reference period against which a loss is measured or the degree of loss triggering payments would be 
among the reasons for such judgements.  
Federal Tax Exemptions for Agriculture 
U.S. domestic support notifications do not include any reporting of revenue forgone due to special tax 
exemptions for agriculture. In its request for a TAMS panel, Brazil identified diesel fuel and gasoline tax 
exemptions, tax exemptions for agricultural vehicles, and income tax concessions as subsidies that might 
need to be notified (WTO 2007a). Among the income tax concessions are special capital gains treatment 
for unharvested crops (notified by the United States as a subsidy under the Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM) Agreement), preferential availability of cash accounting rules for farm operations, and 
preferential availability of income averaging for farmers. The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development includes income tax concession as a payment based on overall farming income, and 
energy subsidies as a payment based on input use, in its Producer Support Estimates (PSEs). The income 
tax concessions are reported to have increased from $554 million in 1996 to $2,078 million in 2005. 
Energy subsidies, defined as the “value of Federal and State exemptions or reductions in excise and sales 
taxes on diesel fuel for farmers relative to the standard rate taxes on fuels” are simply reported as a 
constant $2,385 million from 1986 though 2005. 
Crop and Revenue Insurance Delivery Costs 
The U.S. notifications for crop and revenue insurance report indemnities paid minus premiums paid by 
producers (net indemnities) as non product-specific support. The crop and revenue insurance programs 
also face differences between the total premiums from producers and government, compared with 
indemnities paid, resulting in annual variations in the loss ratio, so that premium subsidies provided by 
the government differ from the net indemnities reported. There are additional expenditures on crop and 
revenue insurance programs arising from delivery costs paid to private insurance agents. These two latter 
costs are not reported in the notifications, but they have been quite substantial, averaging $895.5 million 
per year from 1995 through 2005, whereas net indemnities averaged $1,170.5 million. One can argue that 
the cost reimbursements excluded from the notifications are made to companies on behalf of the  
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policyholders who are farm producers of the insured crops, and thus should be notified as non product-
specific support.  
One might also argue that delivery costs are an administrative expense and as such are exempt 
from the AMS. In that case, they should either not be reported at all or reported in the green box. The U.S. 
reports a wide range of program administration costs under “general services” but none explicitly 
associated with administering its price and income support programs. In contrast, for environmental 
programs, the U.S. reports expenditures for “conservation program technical assistance,” which cost 
$1,320 million in 2005, compared with “environmental payments” of $3,400 million. In this case, both 
the technical assistance and the environmental payments may fit the green-box criteria. It is somewhat 
curious that the crop and revenue insurance delivery costs, which are directly related to delivery of 
benefits to farmers, are not reported. If they are considered a general service, at least they might be 
expected to be notified in the green box.     
Irrigation and Electric Power 
The U.S. reports interest on the debt for irrigation project construction as non product-specific AMS, 
arguing that “irrigators repay the premium but not the interest.” The subsidy has been reported as 
declining from $380 million in 1995 to $269 million in 2005 (Table 8). Arguably, this interest subsidy 
could be considered part of expenditures “directed to the provision or construction of capital works” and 
exempt from the AMS under the green-box criteria of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Not 
having claimed that exclusion, the United States does not seem to include the subsidies to agricultural 
irrigators that arise from lower repayment of capital costs based on assessed “ability to pay,” with the 
reduced capital cost charges to farmers being paid instead by hydroelectric power authorities of the 
projects (again, these subsidies might similarly be argued to be in the green box). No notification is made 
for subsidies that might exist related to maintenance and operating costs (which irrigators apparently are 
required to pay), nor for water charges to agriculture that are below charges to other users. No entry is 
provided concerning preferential charges for electricity used in agriculture, either to move water from its 
source to farmland or for on-farm use of electricity. 
Ethanol 
The issue of how ethanol subsidies are notified is increasingly germane. Some ethanol production 
subsidies were notified by the United States in 2007 for the period 2002–05, and these subsidies may 
increase under the FCE Act or other legislation. More substantially, the forgone revenue from the federal 
ethanol tax credit to fuel blenders and additional state tax provisions could approach $7–8 billion or more 
on corn-based ethanol alone by 2022. If these amounts were to be counted in the AMS, its nominal level 
would be quite different than without the ethanol tax-credit subsidies. 
The United States currently notifies the federal ethanol tax credit to the WTO as an industrial 
subsidy under the SCM Agreement. However, ethanol is included in the set of products defined as 
agricultural under the Uruguay Round agreements, so the tax revenue forgone could be appropriate to be 
notified in the total AMS, with ethanol considered the relevant product. An issue would be the extent to 
which the tax credit is judged to be a “measure directed at processors” that is subject to inclusion in the 
AMS under Annex 3, number 7 “to the extent that such measures benefit producers of the basic 
agricultural product.” There is some ambiguity about whether ethanol is a “basic” agricultural product. If 
so, the issue would arise of the extent to which the blenders’ tax credit is passed through to producers of 
ethanol. 
Because ethanol policies affect corn prices, they might alternatively be judged to be a measure 
directed at producers and affecting the price of corn as a basic agricultural product. This would 
correspond to the way the United States formerly notified Step 2 payments to processors of domestic 
cotton as part of the cotton product-specific AMS. The Step 2 payments were eliminated after being 
found inconsistent with WTO rules in the cotton dispute. It will be interesting to observe how the United  
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States next decides to report the new subsidies to processors of both domestic and imported cotton created 
in the FCE Act, to see whether an analogy between cotton processor subsidies and ethanol processor tax 
credits can continue to be drawn. Of course, if ethanol policies are justified on environmental grounds or 
as related to national security, they could be exempted from the AMS subsidy disciplines, provided they 
meet the criteria of the green box or GATT articles.  
Moreover, the use of mandates versus tax credits raises an issue of whether a certain policy is 
judged a “measure” included among “all of its domestic support measures in favour of agricultural 
producers” that are subject to possible disciplines under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
Article 6 and Annex 3. As shown by de Gorter and Just (2007), when there is no binding mandate, the tax 
credit adds substantially to the level of production of ethanol, its price, and the price and output of corn. 
When there is a binding mandate, the effects of the tax credit itself are minimal, if it is a blend mandate as 
in most of the rest of the world, or zero if it is a consumption mandate as in the United States. In these 
latter cases, it is the binding mandate that has the main effect on ethanol and corn production and prices 
and, one can argue, it should be disciplined under the AMS.  
A few calculations from the simplified de Gorter and Just model clarify the stakes in the 
notification of ethanol policies. They examine the situation in 2006 with a base-model corn price of 
$3.03, corn production of 10.5 billion bushels, an ethanol price of $2.32, and ethanol use of 6.7 billion 
gallons (including imports assumed fixed at 653 million gallons). The base case incorporates the existing 
tax credits and assumes there is no binding mandate. The elimination of the tax credit results in a corn 
price of $2.29, corn production of 9.4 billion bushels, an ethanol price of $2.06, and zero domestic 
ethanol production. With a binding mandate to increase ethanol production by 3 billion gallons, the corn 
price rises to $3.55, corn production to 11.2 billion bushels, the ethanol price to $2.51, and ethanol use to 
10 billion gallons.  
In this model, the revenue forgone due to the tax credit at the production level in the base case is 
$3.4 billion on total ethanol use ($3.1 billion on domestic production). Under the binding mandate case, 
the revenue forgone from the tax credit rises to $5.1 billion. But eliminating the tax credit would have 
little effect on ethanol or corn markets if the mandate is binding. Thus, if the mandate is the notified 
measure, its effects would have to be quantified, requiring a model and elasticity assumptions, which is 
more complicated than measuring tax revenue forgone. In the de Gorter and Just simulations, the mandate 
raises ethanol prices by $0.45 per gallon, compared with the simulation without mandates or tax credits, 
so the gross revenue of ethanol producers increases by $4.5 billion, measured at the level of production 
with the mandate (and by $25.1 billion, compared with revenue at the equilibrium price and output 
without the mandate or tax credits). Simultaneously, the mandate raises the price of corn by $1.26 per 
bushel, compared with the simulation without the mandate or tax credits, so the revenue of corn producers 
increases by $14.1 billion, measured at the level of production with the mandate (and by $39.8 billion, 
compared with revenue at the equilibrium price and output without the mandate or tax credits). Of course, 
these are not economic welfare effects but simply revenue effects using a price gap and some level of 
production for each scenario. Measuring gains in producer surplus as the benefit to ethanol or corn 
producers would yield smaller magnitudes. 
Beyond determining the effects of alternative ethanol policies there is the question of who 
potentially suffers injury from these policies. Mandates and tax concessions themselves do not harm 
potential exporters of ethanol or corn. The mandates and subsidies raise agricultural prices, so it is net 
food-importing countries or livestock producers facing higher costs that may be adversely affected. There 
is no basis under the SCM Agreement for importers who are affected by higher world prices due to 
subsidy policies to bring disputes to the WTO, so this agreement would not be applicable to the ethanol 
subsidies and mandates except to the extent that world gasoline prices are depressed. 
The AMS commitment could be relevant, but the AMS would be composed of a curious mix of 
policies if ethanol subsidies were included. The historic metaphor for U.S. policy has been that it often 
has “one foot on the gas and one foot on the brake” in terms of stimulating production. The “on the gas” 
part has been the focus of attention regarding the U.S. total AMS; what is the value of subsidies that 
stimulate production? The “on the brake” part has gone into two other categories: the green box for long- 
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term conservation land idling and the blue box in terms of pre-FAIR Act short-term acreage set-asides, 
where the annual land-idling component exempted the price support component from counting in the 
AMS.  
With ethanol mandates and subsidies, the new metaphor for the AMS would be the United States 
having its feet on two accelerators. But the accelerators have different effects on world prices, and thus on 
the interests of various trade partners and constituents within these countries. The traditional accelerator 
of supply expansion drives world prices down. The new accelerator of demand augmentation drives world 
prices up. Recent events have demonstrated the potency of the latter policies.   
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5.  PROJECTED U.S. NOTIFICATIONS 
Using a spreadsheet-based model, we derive projections for the major categories in the U.S. notifications 
through 2014, using program parameters from the 2008 FCE Act for 2008–14. Data for 1995–2005 are 
drawn from official notifications, the shadow notification is used for 2006, and estimates for 2007 are 
derived using the parameters of the 2002 FSRI Act. The projections are based on the domestic support 
simulator developed by Blandford and Josling (2007). Data for projected production and prices are 
derived primarily from the February 2008 USDA baseline to 2017 (USDA 2008c), with updates through 
July 2008 for 2006–08 (where applicable) from the online data set of the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS), USDA. Cotton and peanut price and production projections are derived from the March 
2008 CBO budget baseline (Hull, Langley and Hitz 2008). That is also the source for expenditures under 
conservation programs and on crop and revenue insurance, with adjustments considered to reflect the 
subsequent FCE Act. Overall, the commodity prices used in the projections are relatively high due to a 
range of factors, including domestic demand for biofuels, strong overseas demand for U.S. commodities 
due to income growth, dietary change, and a weak dollar. 
The projections are first evaluated in the context of continuation of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement (URA). We then examine the implications of proposed modalities under the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations. 
With No DDA Agreement  
Figure 3 summarizes the projected notifications in the various boxes through 2014. Green-box support is 
projected to increase steadily from the last officially notified amount of $72 billion in 2005 (Table 3) to 
roughly $95 billion in 2014, primarily due to increased expenditures on domestic food assistance 
programs projected on the basis of their recent growth rates. The general services component of the green 
box is also projected to increase from around $11 billion in 2005 to $15 billion in 2014 in line with a 
general increase in government costs. Expenditures on conservation programs are projected to increase 
from a notified value of $3.4 billion in 2005 to over $6 billion in 2014.
14 Our estimates incorporate a 
reduction in fixed direct payments of $0.8 billion. This results primarily because we assume that there is a 
substantial enrollment of 90 percent of the production of corn, soybeans and wheat  in the optional ACRE 
program introduced in the 2008 FCE Act. The potential implications of this program are discussed in 
more detail below. On the basis of our projections, Figure 4 indicates that projected green-box support 
would make up roughly 95 percent of total support by 2014, compared with 80 percent in 2005. 
                                                      
14 These projections include adjustments to account for increased expenditures anticipated under the FCE Act compared to 
the 2002 FSRI Act based on the CBO March 2007 budget baseline (CBO 2008) rather than the 2008 USDA and CBO baselines 
that are utilized for our crop production and price projections.   
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
In projecting the AMS, we have made several key assumptions about future U.S. notifications. 
The first relates to the notification of the MPS for dairy. The FCE Act introduces an important 
definitional change in U.S. dairy policy. As indicated above, prior to this act the U.S. dairy support 
program was defined with respect to a support price for milk. That structure was reflected in U.S.  
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notifications because the market price support calculation was applied to total milk production. The FCE 
Act redefines the program with respect to support for three dairy products: butter, cheddar cheese, and 
nonfat dry milk. Prices are defined to be consistent with the previous support price for milk ($9.90 per 
hundredweight). One consequence of this change is to allow the United States to notify market price 
support for dairy on the basis of production of the three dairy products concerned, rather than the total 
volume of milk production. We build this change in notifications into our projections beginning in 2008. 
There are some technical questions associated with how the calculation would be made, but we estimate 
that the redesign of the dairy support program would reduce notified market price support for dairy by 
roughly 65 percent. 
The second key assumption concerns the ACRE program. Unlike countercyclical payments 
linked to fixed base areas and fixed yield levels, the revenue-guarantee payments under the ACRE 
program are linked to current acreage and yields of the crops grown. It remains to be seen how the United 
States will argue that these payments should be classified, particularly whether they will be argued to 
qualify as non product-specific: for example, because the ACRE program applies to all covered 
commodities and does not require that a farmer plant any particular crop. In our analysis, we assume that 
ACRE payments will be notified as product-specific due to the formula of the revenue guarantee tied to a 
moving average of prices and crop yields, rather than fixed base levels, with the ACRE payments 
depending on current prices and farm acreage and yields for specific crops.  
The projected product-specific AMS varies from year-to-year, but relatively high commodity 
prices foreseen by USDA and other analysts early in 2008 imply that the projected support expenditures 
for major crops are extremely modest, typically averaging less than $0.4 billion per year. The notified 
product-specific AMS on all major products other than dairy and sugar would qualify for de minimis if 
there are no ACRE revenue-guarantee payments. On the basis of these projections, the total AMS would 
stay far below the URA total AMS commitment of $19.1 billion (Figure 3). Figure 4 shows that by 2014 
the projected total AMS (after de minimis) would amount to roughly $3.5 billion, composed entirely of 
market price support for dairy and sugar, and it would account for only 3 percent of the total support 
notified by the United States, including all green-box expenditures. 
As described above, during 1995–2005 the de minimis NPS support has been an important 
component in the U.S. notifications. Recall that this category of support has varied from less than $1 
billion to more than $7 billion (Table 8). The major source of the variation is the price-linked payments 
(crop MLAs and countercyclical); annual crop and revenue insurance subsidies also varied significantly.  
With the relatively high commodity prices assumed in the projections for 2008–14, there are only 
modest countercyclical payments for cotton and peanuts. However, crop and revenue insurance subsidies 
are expected to remain high, averaging roughly $4.4 billion per year.
15 The projected NPS support is less 
than $6.0 billion, including countercyclical payments. This level easily falls under de minimis. With a 
projected value of production of roughly $400 billion in 2014, it leaves room for about $14.8 billion of 
additional NPS spending without crossing the de minimis threshold.
16   
As shown in Figure 5 the “available” AMS (the difference between the notified total AMS and 
the total AMS binding) would be $15.6 billion in 2014. Domestic commodity programs could provide 
that much additional notified total AMS and the United States would still satisfy its Uruguay Round 
WTO commitment. If non product-specific support was kept under the de minimis threshold, additional 
support in the total AMS and NPS support categories could reach as much as $30.4 billion in 2014 
without violating any U.S. commitments. The 2008 FCE Act pays little regard to the implications of any 
future WTO commitments and does not address issues that have been raised by recent WTO panel 
rulings, in particular the consistency of U.S. fixed direct payments with Annex 2 of the Uruguay Round 
                                                      
15 These estimates of crop and revenue insurance subsidies exclude adjustments estimated by CBO to average $168 million 
over 2008–11 (due to reduced program costs) and $3,189 million in 2012 (due primarily to delay of some payments to lower the 
projected five-year cost of the FCE Act). 
16 The projected increase in the value of production from $236 billion in the 2005 notification to almost $400 billion in 2014 
is a factor in the size of this potential exemption. Naturally, if prices of agricultural products were to fall substantially the NPS de 
minimis threshold would also decline.  
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Agreement on Agriculture. But with projected high commodity prices, the fixed direct payments could 
easily fit within the U.S. AMS commitment in the future, whether counted as product-specific or non 
product-specific support. Likewise, were a judgment made that ethanol blender tax credits (not 
incorporated into our projections) should be notified in the product-specific AMS category, they could 
also be included without violating the U.S. limit.  
Figure 5. Projected composition of disciplined U.S. support in 2014 (US$ billion) and available 













Source: Authors’ estimates. 
This apparently favorable picture for U.S. policymakers and farmers of essentially no constraints 
on U.S. subsidies under the URA could change if prices are not as strong as forecast by USDA and 
others. Nevertheless, prices would have to fall substantially from recent and projected levels to trigger 
large payments with the loan rates and target prices specified for the traditional price-linked support 
programs in the 2008 FCE Act.  
The  new element of the ACRE program also needs to be considered. As noted above, ACRE is 
an optional revenue stabilization program. It is uncertain how many farmers will choose to enroll in the 
ACRE program. However, to illustrate the possible ACRE effects on the total AMS given the relatively 
high commodity prices in 2007 and 2008, we use the assumption that 90 percent of total production of 
three crops (corn, wheat, and soybeans) would be covered by the program.
17 ACRE payments can be 
triggered by a decline in state yields, the U.S. price, or a combination of the two, and they also depend on 
the extent to which individual farms in the eligible states demonstrate that they have suffered a loss of 
revenue. Our analysis does not take into account variations in yield at the national or state level, nor the 
farm-specific loss eligibility criterion. For illustration we simply examine the impact of price variations 
on possible ACRE expenditures and consequent total AMS notifications. Our limited aim is to illustrate 
how price variation alone could affect U.S. notified support with the ACRE program. The baseline 
production numbers are not altered in our analysis: it is difficult to relate variations in national production 
                                                      
17 Actual sign up is in terms of farms. The share of production used here reflects an assumption that major producers of the 
three crops will elect to enroll. Such an assumption was used by the Bush administration in its critical analysis (discussed earlier 
in the paper) of the program during the final deliberations on the FCE Act .  
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to payments at the farm or state levels, so no attempt was made to incorporate this. Actual payouts could 
be higher or lower than estimated here as a result of production variations. The sign-up rate is always 
critical. For any given sign-up rate, the natural price–quantity hedge would be likely to lessen total 
payments, while eligibility determination by states is likely to raise total payments, with the individual 
farm eligibility criterion possibly acting again to reduce total costs (Zulauf 2008). 
To simulate the possible ACRE revenue-guarantee payments, price patterns for corn, wheat, and 
soybeans were derived for three historical periods when price volatility was evident (1974–80, 1980–86, 
and 1995–2001). These patterns were applied to the base data in the current projections to give a 
“scenario” similar to the three historical periods.
18 Each of these periods (for convenience we refer to 
them as the 1970, 1980, and 1990 price patterns) was characterized by relatively high commodity prices 
in an initial year in each of the markets, similar to the recent situation. As is usual in projections based on 
trends, there is limited variability in the prices of commodities in the official baseline that we used for the 
projected notifications, and thus no ACRE revenue-guarantee payments are induced at the projected 
prices. However, Table 12 summarizes the average price variation (average absolute percentage year-to-
year changes) for the three commodities in the baseline and for the three price pattern scenarios. The 
variability is substantially higher in all cases in the three scenarios than in the baseline projections and is 
more consistent with historical variation observed since the beginning of the 1960s (final column of the 
table). 
Table 12. Summary of price variation for corn, soybeans, and wheat 
   Average annual change in prices (%) 
   Baseline  1970s  1980s  1990s  1960–2007 
Corn 2%  14%  19%  10%  16% 
Soybeans 1% 20%  18%  9%  15% 
Wheat 3%  19%  8%  11%  16% 
Source: Calculated from USDA data, various years.   
Figure 6 summarizes the results of our ACRE analysis. It shows the notified total AMS over the 
period 2009–14 for the three commodity price-cycle periods, compared with the baseline projection 
without ACRE revenue-guarantee payments. The notified total AMS tends to be higher when price 
variability and ACRE payments are introduced. For example, under a repeat of the 1990s cycle that 
triggered substantial emergency payments to farmers, the total AMS is increased by roughly $4 billion in 
the initial years of price decline, but then the figures fall to the baseline numbers as prices become more 
stable. The 1980s cycle shows greater variation in the total AMS, and in 2012, it approaches the U.S. 
Uruguay Round commitment of $19.1 billion. This reflects the impact of a particularly sharp upward 
movement in corn and soybean prices in 2011 (1983 in the historical series), followed by an almost 
equally large downturn in prices in the following year. The ACRE revenue-guarantee price trigger is 
based on a two-year moving average, so (other things being equal) sharp downward movements in prices 
from year-to-year can result in significant payouts. Our results indicate that while it may be unlikely that 
the ACRE program would cause the United States to exceed the Uruguay Round commitment on total 
AMS, history suggests that this cannot be ruled out. Were the United States to face more stringent 
constraints on support as the result of a DDA agreement, the likelihood of violating the constraint would 
be increased substantially. 
                                                      
18 Percentage year-to-year changes in nominal average U.S. farm prices were computed from National Agricultural 
Statistical Service (NASS/USDA) data. These percentages were then applied to the baseline prices used in the projections. 
Consequently, projected market prices in 2009 are computed as the USDA baseline price for 2008 (or the updated price from 
NASS) multiplied by the percentage change from 1974 to 1975 and so on through to 2014. For the other scenarios, the changes 
from 1980 to 1981 and from 1995 to 1996 provide the starting values. Use of these starting points avoids the introduction of 
initial commodity price spikes, for example in 1973–74, in order to avoid the introduction of excessive variation in the 
simulations, but it reflects periods in which commodity prices are initially quite high.   
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
With a DDA Agreement 
Table 13 summarizes the draft modalities for domestic support proposed by the chairman of the 
agricultural negotiations (WTO 2008) but not agreed upon by member countries when a WTO mini-
ministerial meeting in Geneva ended in July 2008. At the time of the writing of this paper, it is unclear 
whether the negotiations will resume at some stage or whether the round has been abandoned. In any 
event, it is useful to examine what the terms of the agreement would imply for U.S. domestic support 
notifications. 
The modalities are particularly complicated in the case of the United States, involving several 
provisions that are either unique or of particular relevance to the U.S. situation. Of particular note are: 
1.  a special provision for the calculation of product-specific AMS limits as described in the 
table; 
2.  the expansion of the blue-box criteria to include payments based on 85 percent or less of a 
fixed and unchanging base level of production; this implies that current U.S. countercyclical 
payments (but not ACRE payments) would be eligible for inclusion in the blue box, rather 
than being notified as non product-specific AMS as is currently the case; 
3.  a special provision for the calculation of product-specific blue-box limits, as described in the 
table, with a more stringent cap for cotton; and 
4.  a larger reduction in the AMS limit for cotton than for other commodities, with an accelerated 
reduction schedule.  
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Table 13. Main U.S. domestic support provisions of the proposed DDA modalities of July 2008 




Base OTDS = Final Bound Total 
AMS + 15% of the average value of 
domestic production (VOP) for 1995–
2000 
Total reduction of 70%. Initial reduction of one 




measure of support 
(AMS) 
 
Base level is Final Bound Total AMS 
(from Uruguay Round schedules) 
 
Total reduction of 60%. Reduction of 25% on first 
day of implementation with remaining amount in 





Derived by applying product-specific 
(PS) AMS averages for 1995–2004 to 
total PS AMS average for 1995–2000
a 
 
Implemented in full on first day of implementation 
period, except when PS AMS in two most recent 
years is higher. Then limits implemented in three 
equal installments with starting point being the 





Current allowance of 5% of current 
VOP 
 
Reduction of 50% in allowance effective on the first 
day of the implementation period. Additional 
reduction if necessary to satisfy the OTDS binding 




Countercyclical payments based on 
fixed and unchanging areas and yields, 
and 85% of fixed and unchanging base 
production would qualify 
 
Capped at 2.5% of the average VOP for 1995–2000 





110–120% of amounts derived from 
applying proportionately legislated 
maximum permissible expenditure 
under 2002 FSRI Act to 2.5% average 
VOP for 1995–2000 – values as 
specified in the modalities 
 
Scheduled limit can be increased with 
corresponding (1-to-1) decrease in PS AMS (2-to-1 
ratio for cotton). Limit can be increased during 
implementation period subject to overall blue-box 





AMS reduction of 82.2% over two years. Product-
specific blue-box limit to be one-third of that 
otherwise applicable 
Source: Authors’ summary based on WTO (2008). 
a Qualifications apply if product-specific AMS amounts above de minimis levels have been introduced since the base period (para 
24) or the product-specific AMS was below the de minimis level during each year of the base period (para 25). In the former 
case, an average of the two most recent notified AMS values can be used as the base; in the latter case, the de minimis level for 
the base period may be used. 
The implications of the proposed DDA modalities for the United States are summarized in Tables 
14 and 15. Table 14 gives the year-by-year implementation schedule for reductions in the overall trade-
distorting support (OTDS), total AMS, and cotton AMS, and the proposed reduction in de minimis and 
the blue box. The base value of OTDS from which reductions are to be made is $48.2 billion (not shown), 
comprised of the Uruguay Round AMS cap of $19.1 billion plus 15 percent of the U.S. total agricultural 
value of production, which averaged $194.1 billion during 1995–2000. The reduction for the cotton AMS 
is accelerated (reduction of 82.2 percent over 20 months from a base value calculated as $800 million), 
compared with the five-year implementation (completion by the end of year 5) proposed for the OTDS 
and total AMS.   
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With the proposed 70 percent reduction, tentatively agreed to by the United States in Geneva, the 
final binding for the OTDS is just under $14.5 billion at the end of a five-year implementation period.
19 
The 60 percent reduction in the Uruguay Round total AMS would reduce this cap to $7.64 billion. The 
AMS for cotton would be cut to roughly $143 million. The product-specific and NPS de minimis 
thresholds would be reduced immediately from the current 5 percent to 2.5 percent. Total blue-box 
payments would be limited to a maximum of $4.85 billion. 
Table 14. U.S. domestic support base values and reductions under the proposed DDA modalities 
   Immediate  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
Reductions           
Proportions of the base OTDS and AMS 
t o   b e   c u t            
   OTDS (70% reduction)
a    0.33 0.40 0.48 0.55 0.63  0.70 
   AMS (25% initial; 60% total  
reduction)
b  0.25 0.32 0.39 0.46 0.53  0.60 
   Cotton AMS (25% initial; 82.22% 
total)
c  0.25  0.25 82.22 82.22 82.22  82.22 
             
Scheduled limits           
OTDS (70% reduction; US$ million)  $32,310.2  $28,741.6  $25,173.0  $21,604.4  $18,035.8  $14,467.3 
AMS (25% initial; 60% total reduction; 
US$  million)  $14,327.5 $12,990.2 $11,653.0 $10,315.8  $8,978.5  $7,641.3 
Cotton AMS (25% initial; 82.22% total 
reduction; US$ million)
d    $600.4 $600.4 $142.5         
De minimis           
50%  immediate  reduction  (%)  2.5%         
             
Blue box           
2.5% value of 1995–2000 production 
(US$ million)  
         
$4,853.5         
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WTO (2008). 
a Initial reduction of one third with the remainder phased-in in five equal steps (paragraph 5).
 
b Initial reduction of 25% with the remainder phased-in in five equal steps (paragraph 15). 
c Two-year phase-in period with higher total reduction percentage. 
d Implementation period is one-third of the general period. 
Table 15 contains calculations for the product-specific AMS bindings. The first thing to note is 
that the sum of product-specific caps is just over $15 billion, almost double the proposed overall AMS 
limit. Thus, the United States would not be able to provide the full amount of support allowed for each 
specific commodity while respecting its total AMS commitment.  
More specifically, the modalities in Table 13 imply the following:  
1.  Only one of the 47 commodity categories for which an AMS was notified by the United 
States for at least one year since 1995 would have a zero AMS binding. This is avocados, 
for which a small amount of trade-adjustment assistance payments was notified in 2005, 
thus falling outside of the base period.  
2.  Five of the commodities would be subject to the three-year phase-in for the reduction 
specified by paragraph 26 of the draft modalities (barley, corn, dairy, sorghum, and 
                                                      
19 During the July 2008 negotiations a further reduction to $14 billion was also discussed.  
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sugar); all but dairy and sugar would be subject to an additional reduction in their AMS 
limit implied by the 130 percent restriction in paragraph 26. 
3.  The cotton binding would be superseded by additional provisions. In the absence of these 
provisions the cotton AMS binding would be reduced from a base value of roughly $1.5 
billion to a bound value of roughly $1.1 billion (not shown in the table) over a period of 
three years. The additional provisions result in a reduction to a bound value of $143 
million over a period of 20 months. 
4.  If the methodology specified in the modalities is applied strictly, some commodities 
could be eligible for multiple caps (for example, those products notified separately and 
under aggregates such as “livestock” and “orchards and vineyards”). 
5.  Overall, the application of the rules specified in the modalities creates a considerable 
amount of space for policy flexibility by providing product-specific AMS limits for 
virtually all important and minor U.S. agricultural commodities, even if the actual 
notified support for some of these has been small in the past. But as revealed by the 
notified AMS for 2005 (final column in the table), it may be difficult to keep within 
some of the caps if prices were to fall. The cap on corn at $1.1 billion, compared with a 
notified AMS of $4.5 billion in 2005, is particularly noteworthy in this respect. 
Table 16 contains information on product-specific blue-box bindings that are included in the draft 
modalities. The U.S. limits are based upon the maximum potential expenditure on countercyclical 
payments under the 2002 FSRI Act.
20  Using the lower of two proposed totals in the modalities (110 
percent limit, see Table 13) the blue-box caps would permit an expenditure on countercyclical payments 
equivalent to roughly 61 percent of the legislated maximum. The higher figure (120 percent) yields 66 
percent of this maximum. As indicated in Table 14, the maximum permitted expenditure under the blue 
box would be roughly $4.8 billion. This implies that it would only be possible to exploit the full 
allowance provided by the individual blue-box caps under the lower (110 percent) binding, as shown in 
Table 16.  
The draft modalities indicate that countries can elect to increase the blue-box binding for 
individual products by reducing that product’s corresponding AMS binding. This is done on a dollar-for-
dollar basis, except for cotton where the rate is two-to-one. Table 16 analyzes the effect of this provision. 
Column E shows the cut in the product-specific AMS that would be required to increase the blue-box 
binding to the legislated maximum expenditure under the 110 percent blue-box binding. Column F flags 
those cases where this is not feasible because the AMS binding is too low. Column G shows the initial 
product-specific AMS that would result if either the blue-box binding for that product is increased to meet 
the legislated maximum expenditure (if the AMS binding is sufficient to allow this), or the maximum 
feasible blue-box binding (if all the available AMS amount for that commodity is used). Columns I 
through L repeat these calculations for the case of the 120 percent blue-box binding. 
                                                      
20 The maxima are calculated as (target price – direct payment rate – loan rate) x countercyclical payments (CCP) yield per 
acre x base CCP acres x 0.85.  
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Table 15. Product-specific AMS bindings under the proposed DDA modalities 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on WTO notifications and WTO (2008). 
aThe effective binding for cotton is that implied by the 
special reduction provisions but base value shown is not adjusted for these special provisions.  
   Paragraph  Base  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Notified AMS 2005 
     (US$ million)     
Apples  25 76.588 76.588  76.588 76.588  0.000 
Apricots  25 1.813 1.813  1.813 1.813  0.000 
Avocados  NA 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Barley 23,26  35.636  32.895 30.153  27.412  46.196 
Beef and veal  25  1,254.755  1,254.755 1,254.755  1,254.755  0.000 
Blueberries, wild  25  1.785 1.785  1.785 1.785  0.000 
Cattle and calves  25  1,255.376  1,255.376 1,255.376  1,255.376  0.000 
Chickpeas  24 0.228 0.228  0.228 0.228  0.304 
Corn 23,26  1,438.375  1,327.730 1,217.086  1,106.442  4,490.004 
Cotton
a 23,26  1,476.986  600.399  142.495 142.495  1,620.699 
Cranberries  25 10.717 10.717  10.717 10.717  0.000 
Dairy
  23,26 4,905.901 4,864.218  4,822.535 4,780.853  5,149.254 
Dry  peas  24 34.771 34.771  34.771 34.771  37.431 
Grapes  25 131.175 131.175  131.175 131.175  0.000 
Hogs and pigs  25  512.837  512.837  512.837  512.837  0.000 
Honey  23 2.891 2.891  2.891 2.891  0.000 
Lentils  24 6.126 6.126  6.126 6.126  11.375 
Livestock 25  1,255.376  1,255.376 1,255.376  1,255.376  0.000 
Lychee  25 0.232 0.232  0.232 0.232  0.000 
Minor oil seeds            0.000 
    Canola  23  15.119  15.119  15.119  15.119  13.518 
    Crambe  24  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.000 
    Flaxseed  24  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.000 
    Mustard seed  23  0.105  0.105  0.105  0.105  0.000 
    Rapeseed  23  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.000 
    Safflower  23  0.538  0.538  0.538  0.538  0.000 
    Sesame  23  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011  0.000 
    Sunflower  23  35.544  35.544  35.544  35.544  0.000 
Mohair  23 3.136 3.136  3.136 3.136  1.542 
Oats  23 9.415 9.415  9.415 9.415  0.000 
Olives  25 2.941 2.941  2.941 2.941  0.000 
Onions  25 35.135 35.135  35.135 35.135  0.000 
Orchards and vineyards  25  798.187  798.187  798.187  798.187  0.000 
Peaches  25 21.979 21.979  21.979 21.979  0.000 
Peanuts  23 249.190 249.190  249.190 249.190  89.185 
Pears  25 14.034 14.034  14.034 14.034  0.000 
Pecan  trees  25 11.707 11.707  11.707 11.707  0.000 
Potatoes  25 133.431 133.431  133.431 133.431  0.000 
Rice  23 313.677 313.677  313.677 313.677  132.509 
Rye  25 1.405 1.405  1.405 1.405  0.000 
Sheep and lamb  24  7.000  7.000  7.000  7.000  0.000 
Sorghum  23,26 55.378 51.118  46.858 42.598  139.751 
Soybeans 23  1,123.717  1,123.717 1,123.717  1,123.717  0.000 
Sugar 23,26  1,240.561  1,202.378 1,164.195  1,126.012  1,199.205 
Tobacco 23  142.923  142.923 142.923  142.923  0.000 
Tomatoes  25 86.202 86.202  86.202 86.202  0.000 
Wheat  23 231.385 231.385  231.385 231.385  0.000 
Wool  23 10.095 10.095  10.095 10.095  6.624 
Total product-specific AMS  16,944.451  15,870.352 15,214.938  15,017.427 12,937.597  
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Table 16. Product-specific blue-box bindings and the trade-off with AMS product-specific bindings 
  
                                                                                Reduction of the initial PS AMS to meet the legislated maximum 
CCP for each commodity 












































   Column 
   A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L 
   (US$ million)    (US$ million)    (US$ million) 
Barley  27.4 32.0 34.9  46.7 14.7     12.7 46.7  11.8     15.6 46.7 
Corn 1,106.4  2,359.8  2,574.3  3,224.2  864.4     242.0 3,224.2  649.9    456.5 3,224.2 
Cotton
c  800.5 336.3 366.9  1,376.5  2,080.4  INF
  0.0 1,136.8  2,019.2  INF  0.0 1,167.4 
Oats  9.4 5.3 5.8  8.7 3.4     6.0 8.7  2.9     6.5 8.7 
Peanuts 249.2  149.5  163.1  200.9  51.4     197.8 200.9 37.8     211.4 200.9 
Rice 313.7  234.9  256.3  323.1  88.2     225.5 323.1 66.8     246.9 323.1 
Sorghum 42.6  106.8  116.5  147.4  40.6     2.0 147.4 30.9     11.7 147.4 
Soybeans  1,123.7 400.4 436.8  550.3 149.9     973.8 550.3  113.5     1,010.2 550.3 
Wheat  231.4  1,041.1  1,135.7  1,421.5 380.4  INF  0.0  1,272.5 285.8  INF  0.0  1,367.1 
Total 3,904.4  4,666.1  5,090.3 7,299.3     6,910.6       7,035.8 
Source: Authors' calculations based on WTO notifications and WTO (2008)
 
a It is assumed that the applicable figures for the calculation are the bindings that result after the application of any reduction 
provisions. 
b Where insufficient PS AMS entitlement exists to reach the legislated maximum CCP, the maximum PS AMS entitlement is 
applied to the blue box.
 
c In the case of cotton, a $1 increase in the blue-box entitlement requires a $2 reduction in the PS AMS; this is applied to the 
figure in column 1. Cotton blue-box bindings are reduced substantially by the paragraph 56 condition. 
INF = infeasible 
Note: Totals in bold exceed permitted blue-box total of $4,835.5 million. Increases in blue-box limits only apply if initially 
scheduled; any subsequent changes would require reductions elsewhere, such that the initial overall blue box limit is not 
exceeded (paragraph 45). 
The calculations show that box-shifting could achieve the legislated maxima for all commodities 
individually except cotton and wheat (this is without considering any additional constraints imposed by 
the total blue-box cap). For those commodities the AMS binding is too low to achieve the legislated 
maximum. However, it should be borne in mind that the sum of the individual product bindings is below 
the total blue-box cap only with the 110 percent figure. That yields a total of $4.7 billion in potential blue-
box payments, compared with a total blue-box cap of $4.8 billion. Consequently, there may be some 
limits on the scope for box shifting for individual commodities while staying within the overall blue-box 
constraint. In the analysis that follows, we assume that the United State elects not to use this box shifting 
option for any of the commodities concerned. Possible ACRE revenue-guarantee payments are also not 
included in the basic calculations.  
To derive projections of the extent to which the new DDA agreement might constrain U.S. 
domestic support policies, the following assumptions are made: 
1.  The first year for implementation of a new agreement is 2009 with complete implementation by 
2014. 
2.  The OTDS commitment is reduced by 70 percent and the total AMS by 60 percent according to 
the schedule in Table 14.  
  37  
3.  The additional reduction in cotton AMS and accelerated reduction schedule is applied as in Table 
14. 
4.  There is an immediate reduction in de minimis to 2.5 percent. 
5.  The product-specific AMS bindings included in Table 15 are imposed. 
6.  The 110 percent product-specific blue-box bindings (column B in Table 16) are applied. 
7.  No allowance is made for the transfer of product-specific AMS to product-specific blue box. 
8.  The parameters of U.S. support programs are those defined in the 2008 FCE Act.  
Figure 7 summarizes actual and projected notifications in terms of the DDA concepts of the green 
box, the OTDS, the total AMS (after de minimis, so non product-specific support is excluded), and the 
expanded blue box. The green-box projection is unchanged from that discussed above. The switch of 
countercyclical payments out of the non product-specific AMS leads to modest blue-box payments that do 
not register visually on the graph. The total AMS and OTDS are below those in recent years because of 
the projected high price environment.  






























Green Box Current OTDS Current Total AMS Blue Box
 
Source: WTO notifications and authors’ estimates. 
Figure 8 shows how the reductions in the OTDS, the total AMS, and the blue box relate to 
projected notifications for the assumed implementation period. The reduction in the OTDS does not 
become binding even by the end of the implementation period, but the leeway in the commitment, 
resulting from the limit being higher than projected notifications, is substantially reduced. Our projections 
suggest that in the first year of implementation of the agreement, there would be a roughly $20 billion 
cushion between the actual OTDS and the bound level. By 2014 this would have declined by about three-
quarters to around $5 billion. The reduction in the total AMS binding is also significant, with a decrease 
in the AMS support cushion from roughly $8 billion in 2010 to $4 billion by 2014. Our analysis also 
shows that non product-specific support stays well below the de minimis threshold, but this threshold 
increases with increased value of production up to a limit imposed by the available OTDS not utilized in  
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other categories. The overall blue-box limit does not have much of an effect on our projections, since, as 
noted earlier, high prices mean that countercyclical payments are low. A maximum of only $0.5 billion 
dollars of the $4.8 billion binding is used each year during the assumed implementation period. 
































Source: WTO (2008) and authors’ estimates. 
We also analyze the implications of the product-specific AMS and blue-box bindings for some of 
the most important commodities (barley, corn, cotton, dairy, peanuts, rice, sorghum, soybeans, sugar, and 
wheat). Our projections suggest that the AMS binding would become operative for sugar from the first 
year of the implementation period and throughout. There is a gradual increase in the amount by which the 
product-specific AMS binding for sugar is exceeded (Figure 9) from around $300 million in 2009 to more 
than $420 million by 2014. Recall that for sugar the AMS arises from the market price support calculation 
based on a fixed reference price and the sugar loan rates (administered prices) in the FCE Act. Our 
projections also imply that the blue-box binding for cotton would be exceeded from 2011 onwards due to 
the severe reduction in the blue-box cap for this particular commodity. The blue-box calculation depends 
on projected cotton market prices.
21  
                                                      
21 Using earlier projected cotton prices, both the product-specific blue-box and AMS commitments were binding for cotton 
(see Blandford, Laborde and Martin, 2008).  
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
In summary, new DDA commitments are certainly much more stringent than those of the URA. 
The DDA commitments might constrain U.S. farm programs in terms of instrument choices or subsidy 
levels. Strengthened disciplines would reduce the leeway the U.S. would have for providing trade-
distorting support but still provide flexibility if prices remain relatively high. The net outcome projected 
for 2014 is illustrated in Figure 10. It shows blue-box, AMS, and product-specific and non product-
specific de minimis expenditures projected for 2014. Their sum is compared with the potential limit of 
almost $14.5 billion under a DDA constraint on OTDS by showing unused spending within that 
constraint. Projected blue-box expenditures (countercyclical payments) are only $0.5 billion, well under 
the modalities cap of $4.8 billion. Likewise, total AMS (excluding de minimis) is projected at $3.4 billion, 
well under the proposed cap of $7.6 billion. Product-specific de minimis is negligible and non product-
specific de minimis is projected at $4.8 billion. These projections and caps leave room for various 
additional OTDS expenditures of $5.4 billion. More than half of the latitude available reflects the 
redefinition of the dairy support program in the FCE Act, which reduces the projected dairy AMS by as 
much as $3.6 billion.  
  40  















Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: difference of sum in figure from OTDS limit is due to rounding error. 
Finally, it should be stressed that we have not accounted for possible ACRE revenue-guarantee 
payments in this assessment of the possible effects of strengthened DDA disciplines on U.S. domestic 
support. As indicated above, these could be triggered even if market prices remain relatively high by 
historical standards. They could cause the $7.6 billion total AMS cap under the proposed DDA modalities 
to be exceeded, as Figure 6 shows, or cause product-specific AMS caps to be exceeded for certain crops. 
While the ACRE program is legislated to come into effect in 2009, concern about payments exceeding 
limits other than the total AMS commitment of the Uruguay Round will remain hypothetical unless a new 
WTO agreement is reached.  
 
  
  41  
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR  
U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
This paper has examined past and proposed U.S. domestic support in light of current and potential WTO 
constraints. In the first section we provided a brief review of U.S. farm policies since the Uruguay Round 
WTO agreements came into effect, including a synopsis of the new farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act of 2008. Our review highlights the shifting alignment of U.S. support policies in response to 
relatively high prices when the 1996 farm bill was enacted versus relatively low prices when these 
policies were reconsidered in the 2002 FSRI Act. In 2008, market prices were again strong, but with the 
exception of the potentially significant ACRE program there was little change to the basic support polices 
adopted in the previous bill. This meant that U.S. price-linked subsidies were projected to fall sharply 
under the 2008 FCE Act, compared with their levels early in the 2000s, with higher subsidies projected 
for crop and revenue insurance. We also highlighted acreage-idling under the CRP and increased 
spending on environmental programs, both of which fall in the green box and are subject to its rules.  
The second section provided an assessment of U.S. domestic support notifications to the WTO 
from 1995–2005 and our preliminary notification estimate for 2006. Green-box expenditures for domestic 
nutrition programs dominate the total dollar values notified by the United States. The main notified 
components of the U.S. support policies for agriculture include fixed direct payments, disaster assistance, 
and environmental payments in the green box; MPS for dairy and sugar and substantial price-linked 
expenditures (loan program payments) in the product-specific AMS; and the non product-specific de 
minimis support (crop market loss assistance (MLA) payments, countercyclical payments, and crop and 
revenue insurance subsidies). The AMS price-linked payments varied from a low of $6 million in 1996 to 
a high of $9.6 billion in 1999, while crop MLA payments and countercyclical payments varied from $0.5 
billion in 2003 to $5.5 billion in 1999.  
The U.S. notified total AMS has never exceeded the Uruguay Round commitment of $19.1 
billion. It would have in some years without the non product-specific de minimis exemption or if fixed 
direct payments were included in the AMS as either non product-specific or product-specific support. 
These issues have been raised in past and ongoing Brazilian and Canadian challenges to U.S. subsidies. 
Section 3 of our paper discusses other subsidies that may be underreported, misclassified, or omitted from 
the U.S. notifications, some of which are also at issue in the WTO challenges. We note that tax credits 
and mandates related to ethanol production have been largely outside of the disciplines of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture and discuss arguments related to their inclusion in the total AMS.  
In Section 4 we provided an assessment of projected U.S. support through 2014 and evaluated the 
extent to which either the Uruguay Round commitments or new disciplines under a DDA agreement 
might limit U.S. policies. Under the Uruguay Round commitments, there is almost no constraint on U.S. 
policies with projected high prices. The fixed direct payments, large ACRE revenue-guarantee payments, 
or ethanol tax credits could be accommodated without violating the U.S. total AMS commitment. That is 
unlikely to be the case if the new DDA disciplines proposed in July 2008 are agreed upon. With a DDA 
agreement, the room for maneuver is limited. Under high prices, there is still unused expenditure space 
within the OTDS of a projected $5.4 billion in 2014. With this flexibility, and assuming there are no 
ACRE revenue-guarantee payments, the U.S. could raise loan rates or target prices for countercyclical 
payments with the effect of increasing AMS or blue-box expenditures from projected levels of $3.4 
billion and $0.5 billion, respectively, toward the DDA limits of $7.6 billion and $4.8 billion. Pushing both 
of these categories of support to their limits simultaneously would reduce allowed de minimis NPS 
support to only about $2 billion given the OTDS cap, which is less than the projected NPS support level.  
With continued high prices an alternative possibility would be to expand the use of non product-
specific support up to the limit imposed by the de minimis threshold or the overall OTDS constraint. The 
projected value of the NPS de minimis threshold is around $10 billion. Likewise, with the projected AMS 
and blue-box expenditures in 2014 the constraint on NPS support due to the OTDS commitment similarly 
is about $10 billion. There is more leeway to increase de minimis NPS support than total AMS under our  
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projections. For this reason, the United States might seek to notify ACRE payments under this category, 
as we have discussed. Despite this, the potential for box shifting is constrained by the NPS de minimis 
threshold and the total OTDS binding of $14.5 billion. This means large revenue-guarantee payments 
under ACRE, however notified, could violate the U.S. commitments, even if prices remain high enough 
not to trigger traditional countercyclical or loan program payments.    
Even if the economic environment that is foreseen in USDA’s mid-2008 price projections 
materializes, the United States would also have to adapt to new DDA domestic support modalities by 
making modest downward adjustments in the support provided by some of its domestic policies. Recent 
experience with farm legislation shows that this does not mean that such adjustments would be easy to 
make or be politically painless. Product-specific constraints, in particular, could impose some additional 
limits beyond the flexibility at the aggregate level. Sugar poses problems for AMS commitments even if 
world sugar prices are high because of the way MPS is calculated and notified. This might be resolved 
without substantive change in the degree of support provided to U.S. sugar producers by changing the 
nature of the sugar program to reduce the amount of support notified under the AMS.
22  The stringent 
modalities for cotton could create an issue in terms of meeting blue-box commitments under projected 
prices and policies. Other product-specific caps, such as for AMS for corn, limit expenditures well below 
levels that have been observed in the 2000s.  
More generally, the optimistic price environment foreseen in mid 2008 and incorporated into our 
projections may not materialize. In that case, the total AMS constraint and some product-specific AMS 
limits could well be exceeded under a DDA agreement, unless some other alternatives to current support 
policies were found. 
One option for U.S. policymakers in such circumstances would be to use the green box to alter 
the composition of farm support. Green-box support for farmers could be expanded, particularly under the 
environmental category, or under other categories such as decoupled income support payments or disaster 
relief payments that satisfy the green-box criteria. The future status of the U.S. fixed direct payments is 
perhaps in doubt as a result of recent and ongoing WTO challenges, but payment rules could be modified 
to ensure green-box compliance. Again, under low prices, if AMS and blue-box expenditures ratchet up, 
there would be only limited room for NPS de minimis expenditures under the capped OTDS. 
In conclusion, the strengthened disciplines on domestic support in the proposed DDA modalities 
would have the effect of reducing substantially the leeway in the amount of support that can be provided 
to U.S. farmers and still meet WTO commitments. A few commodities pose problems in meeting 
product-specific commitments even with relatively high prices. The option of moving support into the 
non product-specific category could provide some policy space for meeting future WTO commitments, 
particularly in circumstances of binding product-specific AMS or blue-box limits. However, it should be 
stressed that our projections assume a relatively high price environment for major U.S. crops. If prices 
were to fall substantially, so that major countercyclical, price-support, or ACRE revenue-guarantee 
payments were triggered, the likelihood of meeting WTO commitments on domestic support under a 
continuation of existing programs would be substantially different from the basic projections-based 
assessment presented here. 
 
 
                                                      
22 The inclusion of a provision in the 2008 FCE Act to divert government purchases of sugar to the production of ethanol 
opens up the interesting policy that the sugar program (or some part of it) could be defined as a bioenergy program. This might 
also be used to relieve any pressure on sugar protection that arises from changes in market access (tariffs and tariff-rate quotas) 
under a new WTO agreement.  
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